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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Constitutional Law-Avoidance of Constitutional IssuesCourt Policy on
Perhaps the most criticized section of the highly controversial "TaftHartley Act" has been §304, which amended §313 of the Corrupt Practices Act, and prohibited expenditures by any labor union in connection
with federal elections or primaries.1 The Congress of Industrial Organization and its President, Philip Murray, were indicted in the federal
district court because of the publication and distribution of an issue of
"The CIO News" which urged the election of Judge Ed Garmatz, then
a candidate for Congress in Maryland. The publication is a weekly
periodical owned and published by the CIO at the expense and from
the funds of the CIO and with the consent of Mr. Murray.
The district court sustained the defendants' motion to dismiss on
the ground that as "no clear and present danger to the public interest
can be found in the circumstances surrounding the enactment of this
legislation," the abridgment of the First Amendment asserted by the
defendants was unwarranted.2 The government appealed from the district court's decision that the statute was unconstitutional.
In the Supreme Court a majority of five justices held that the indictment should be dismissed for failure to state an offense within the
statute, thus obviating the necessity 9f passing upon the constitutionality of the section. 3 The Court was hard-pressed to find any exceptions in the sweeping language of the statute prohibiting any "expenditure in connection with any election." Nor was it given any assistance
in the legislative history of the Act, for Senator Taft had constantly
emphasized his opinion that such expenditures by a union would be
134 STAT. 864, 2 U. S. C. §251 (1946), as amended, 61 STAT. 159 (1947), 2
U. S. C. §251 (Supp. 1947): "It is unlawful for . . . any labor organization to
make a contribution or expenditure in coumection with any election at which
Presidential and Vice Presidential electors or a Senator or a Representative in
... Congress are to be voted for, or in connection with any primary election
or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any of the foregoing
offices. . . . For the purposes of this section "labor organization" means any
organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee
or plan in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole
or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages,
rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work."
Cf. N. C. GEx. STAT. §163-196(15) (1943) (applying to corporations, but not
to unions).
'United States v. CIO, 77 F. Supp. 355, 358 (D. C. 1948).
'United States v. CIO, 68 Sup. Ct. 1349 (1948) (Mr. Justice Reed, with whom
Mr. Justice Burton, Mr. Justice Jackson, and Chief Justice Vinson joined; Mr.
Justice Frankfurter joined in a concurring opinion).
' See note 1 supra.
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unlawful under the Act unless separate dues were collected for support
of the newspaper. 5 The view of the executive branch of the government, as expressed in the Presidential veto message, was that such union
activity would be prohibited ;O subsequent Congressional debates did not
contravert this interpretation. The Court, however, reasoning that the
word "expenditure" was not intended as an all-embracing term, 7 and
acknowledging the dangers of unconstitutionality of the provision if the
publication of political material by union newspapers were prohibited,
concluded that the words of the statute were susceptible of the interpretation that this particularunion political activity was not proscribed.8
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion, felt that the
Court should not pass upon the constitutionality of the section because
the proceedings failed to present a case or controversy.9 Although the
record presented no evidence of collusion, he felt the Government had
shown no ingenuity in the District Court in attempting to avoid that
court's passing on the constitutional question.' 0
The minority of four justices concurred in the result, but dissented
from the Court's construction of the statute with vigor and convincing
logic, decrying the rewriting of the statute, and accusing the Court of
"abdicating its function in the guise of applying the policy against deciding questions of constitutionality unnecessarily."'"
This case brings int6 focus the controversial Court policy of avoiding passing on constitutional questions except in cases of absolute
necessity. In addition to the Constitutional limitation that the Court
will rule on constitutional questions only in actual cases and contro-

See 93

CONG.

REc. 6436-6438, 6440, 6522 (1947).

The Legislative history of the Act showed that this particular fact situation

was discussed and Congress contemplated its being covered. It further evidenced

that one of the broad purposes of the Act was the protection of union members

holding political views contrary to those supported by the union from use of
funds contributed by them to promote acceptance of those opposing views. See

Mr. justice Rutledge, concurring in the result in United States v. CIO, 68 Sup.
Ct. 1349, 1363 (1948).
'See H. R. REP. No. 334, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1947).
'See United States v. CIO, 68 Sup. Ct. 1349, 1352-1354 (1948).
' But cf. United States v. Sullivan, 68 Sup. Ct. 331, 334 (1948) ("A restrictive

interpretation should not be given a statute merely because . . . giving effect to
the express language employed by Congress might require a court to face a constitutional question. . . . When it is reasonably plain that Congress meant its

Act to prohibit certain conduct, no one of the above references justifies a dis-

tortion of the Congressional purpose, not even if the clearly correct purpose ...
leads inevitably to a holding of constitutional invalidity.").

' United States v. CIO, 68 Sup. Ct. 1349, 1358 (1948)

(the Justice did not

rely upon the Constitutional requirement of a case or controversy per se, but

rather upon the first of the Brandeis maxims to be later discussed).
oId. at 1360 (apparently the Government agreed that the provision abridged
the First Amendment, but argued that the abridgment was justified under the

"clear and present danger" doctrine).
" Id. at 1361-1375 (Mr. justice Rutledge, with whom Mr. Justice Black, Mr.
justice Douglas, and Mr. Justice Murphy joined, concurring in the result, but

on the bases of the unconstitutionality of the statute).
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versies, 1' 2

the Court has formulated seven principles by which it is
guided when faced with a constitutional issue. These maxims are:
(1) the Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in
a friendly, non-adversary proceeding; (2) it will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it;
(3) no rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied will be formulated; (4) no constitutional question, although properly presented by the record, will be
passed upon if there is also some other ground upon which the case
may be disposed of; (5) the Court will not pass upon the validity of
a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured
by its operation; (6) constitutionality of a statute will not be passed
upon at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits; and
(7) the constitutionality of a statute will not be determined if a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be
avoided.13
In the case under discussion, the majority invoked the seventh of
the principles, while Mr. Justice Frankfurter thought that the first
should apply. Decisions in other cases during the present term were
14
also limited by application of the maxims.
Our purpose here is not to question this general policy, but is to
question the judiciousness of the Court's straining to find a meaning
in the statute that was patently not intended by Congress merely to
avoid a determination of constitutionality. The policy is well-founded
on the important considerations of judicial self-restraint and the desirability of considered constitutional decisions based upon clarified
issues. 15 But when the Court is squarely faced with the issue, the
"2See Nashville, C. & St. L. R.R. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249 (1933) ; Muskrat
v. United States, 219 U. S. 346 (1902).
" See Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in part in Ashwander v. Tennessee
Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 346 (1936). See Note, 48 Cot. L. Rnv. 427
(1948) for a thorough discussion of the maxims and cases decided under them,
with special emphasis on Civil Rights cases.
"See, e.g., Oyama v. California, 68 Sup. Ct. 269 (1948) (Court, applying the
third maxim, held that the California Alien Land Law deprived American citizens
of equal protection of the laws, but refused to consider the broader question of
whether the act denied the right to aliens affected by the Law) ; Musser v. Utah,
68 Sup. Ct. 397 (1948) (constitutionality of a statute under the First Amendment
was not passed upon because the Utah Supreme Court had not yet determined
whether the statute might be unconstitutional for vagueness); Republic Natural
Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 68 Sup. Ct. 972 (1948) (an asserted constitutional question
was not decided because there were still "loose ends" in the case). These cases
are to be distinguished from those in which the Court refuses to pass upon the
constitutional issue because proper procedure has not been complied with. See,
g.g., Parker v Illinois, 68 Sup. Ct. 708 (1948) ; Phyle v. Duffy, 68 Sup. Ct. 1131

(1948).
5

See Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U. S. 549, 570
(1947); Wright v. United States, 302 U. S. 583, 604 (1938); Spector Motor
Service v. McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101, 105 (1944).
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avoidance of the constitutional question as a purely dilatory strategem,
even though perhaps such action is dictated by compelling political considerations, does little for the Court's prestige. Both lawer and layman are dissatisfied.1 6 It would seem that decision of an issue fairly
presented is more consistent with the judicial function.
WILLIAM V. BURROW.

Constitutional Law-Judicial Enforcement of Racial
Restrictive Agreements*
In the Racial Restrictive Agreement Cases' the Supreme Court of
the United States decided that state and federal courts cannot enforce
by injunction agreements which exclude persons of a designated race or
color 2 from the ownership or occupancy of real property. Although the
" See, e.g., Editorial, N. Y. Times, June 26, 1948, p. 16, col. 2 ("Hard cases
make bad law"); President Philip Murray in The CIO News, June 28, 1948, p. 3,
col. 1 ("We regret that a majority of the Court did not deem it appropriate to
rule at this time on the constitutionality of the entire political expenditures clause
of the Act.").
* For other comments see Lathrop, The Racial Covenant Cases [1948] Wis. L.
REy. 508; Frank, The United States Supreme Court: 1947-1948, 16 U. OF CHI. L.
REv. 1, 22 (1948); 46 MICH. L. REv. 978 (1948); U. S. News & World Report,
May 14, 1948, pp. 22-23, 50; Time, May 17, 1948, p. 25, col. 3; Popular Government, June, 1948, p. 4 (Institute of Government, Chapel Hill, N. C.). On the
general subject see

PREJUDICE AND PROPERTY

(summary of the brief for the United

States as Ainicus Curiae, Shelley v. Kraemer, Hurd v. Hodge, 68 Sup. Ct. 836,

847 (1948) ; LONG

AND JOHNSON, PEOPLE VS. PROPERTY

(1947).

Shelley v. Kraemer, 68 Sup. Ct. 836 (1948), reversing 355 Mo. 814, 198
S. W. 2d 679 (1946) (recorded agreement restricting property to use and occupancy for fifty years to Caucasians only; specifically excluding Negroes or Mongolians) ; McGhee v. Sipes, 68 Sup. Ct. 836 (1948), reversing 316 Mich. 614, 25
N. W. 2d 638 (1947) (agreement that property . . . shall not be used or occupied
by any person . . . except of the Caucasian race ...
;" to remain in effect until
Jan. 1, 1960; 80% of designated property owners must sign); Hurd v. Hodge,
Uricolo v. Same, 68 Sup. Ct. 847 (1948), reversing 162 F. 2d 233 (App. D. C.
1947) (covenant ". . . that said lot shall never be rented, leased, sold, transferred
or conveyed unto any Negro or colored person, under penalty $2,000 . . . lien
against the land. . . ." No time limit). Unanimous opinions written by Chief
Justice Vinson. See Arthur Krock, The, Chief Justice Closes a Loophole, N. Y.
Times, May 4, 1948, p. 24, col. 5 ("In these two rulings Chief Justice Vinson
revealed his legal and political trend of mind."). Six justices participated; Reed,
Jackson and Rutledge took no part. "The assumption around the Court was
that one or more of them might have owned or were interested in property
restricted by covenants." N. Y. Times, May 4, 1948, p. 1, col. 6. The decision
in Shelley v. Kraemer, supra, governed three orders handed down by the Court
one week later, Trustees of Monroe Ave. Church of Christ v. Perkins, 68 Sup. Ct.
1069 (1) (1948), reversing 147 Ohio St. 537, 72 N. E. 2d 97 (1947); Amer v.
Superior Court of Calif. in and for County of Los Angeles, 68 Sup. Ct. 1069 (2)
(1948); Yin Kim v. Same, 68 Sup. Ct. 1069 (3) (1948) (remanded to Calif.
court to consider its decision in light of Shelley v. Kraemer, supra.).
2 The Justice Department has said the rulings also apply to agreements directed
toward religious groups, News and Observer (Raleigh, N. C.), May 5, 1948,
p. 7, col. 3. No cases have been found with restrictions against Catholics, Protestants, Democrats, or Republicans; although one case suggested the dangers of
residential segregation and mentioned these groups, State v. Darnell, 166 N. C.
300, 302, 81 S. E. 338, 339 (1914) (validity of a municipal zoning ordinance).
The four cases before the Supreme Court involved Negroes. Court noted that
1
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agreements themselves are valid, enforcement by the state court denies
the excluded person the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 3 Enforcement by the fedrestrictive agreements "... have been used to exclude other than Negroes from
the ownership or occupancy of real property. We are informed that such agreements have been directed against Indians, Jews, Chinese Japanese, Mexicans,

Hawaiians, Puerto Ricans, and Filipinos, among others." Shelley v. Kraemer,
supra note 1, at 846 n. 26. Among others: Yin Kim v. Superior Court of State

of Calif. in and for County of Los Angeles, 68 Sup. Ct. 1069 (3) (1948) (Chinese
and Koreans); Essex Real Estate Co. v. Holmes, 37 0. W. N. 69 (1930) (Europeans, except those of English-speaking countries and the French and people of
French descent) ; McGovney, Racial Residential Segregation by State Court Enforcement of Restrictive Agreements, Covenants or Conditionsin Deeds Is Unconstitutional, 33 CALIF. L. REv. 5, 15 (1945) (Hindus, Armenians, or natives of
the Turkish Empire, or descendants of such named persons, etc.). Some agreements except domestic servants. E.g., Pepper v. West End Development Co., 211
N. C. 166, 167, 189 S. E. 628, 629 (1936) ; MANGUM, THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE
NEGRO, 150 (1940); McGovney, supra.
'State Action: There is nothing new in holding that judgment of the state
court is an act of the state. E.g., cases collected in Shelley v. Kraemer, 68 Sup.
Ct. 836, 843 n. 14 (1948). This is the first time the doctrine has been applied to
enforcement of racial restrictive agreements, although such agreements have been
attacked as invalid because they are alleged to be unlawful discrimination within
prohibitions of the Federal Constitution. The courts have uniformly rejected the

contention. Note, 162 A. L. R. 180, 184 (1946) (cases collected). The Supreme
Court here calls the agreements valid, Shelley v. Kraemer, supra at 842. The
only decision contrary is Gandofolo v. Hartman, 49 Fed. 181 (C. C. Calif. 1892).
Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U. S. 323 (1926) has been consistently cited to support
both the validity and the enforceability of racial restrictive agreements. Cases
collected in MANGUS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 147; ROTTSCHAEFER, CoNsTITU-

TIONAL LAW 526 (1939); Note, The Negro Citizen in the Supreme Court, 52
HARv. L. REv. 823, 831 (1939). But the standing of Corrigan,v. Buckley had
been challenged, arguing that although it declared the agreements valid it decided
nothing as to their enforceability in federal courts (the case arose in the District
of Columbia), and most certainly nothing as to enforceability in state courts. See
McGovney, supra note 2, at 15-25; Kahen, Validity of Anti-Negro Restrictive
Covenants: A Reconsideration of the Problem, 12 U. oF CHi. L. Rxv. 198, 202
(1945) ; Taylor, The Racial Restrictive Covenant in the Light of the Equal Protection Clause, 14 Bnoox yN L. Rxv. 80, 88 (1947). But see 45 MicH. L. REv.
733, 740 (1947). The racial restrictive agreements cases settle that issue in favor
of Messrs. McGovney, Kahen, and Taylor, making a technically correct but unrealistic distinction of Corrigan v. Buckley. Frank, The United States Supreme
Court: 1947-1948, 16 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 1, 23 (1948). See 46 MIcH. L. REv.
978 (1948) (arguing that the principal cases open up new fields of litigation);
accord, Editorial, A Blow to Southern Customs, Charlotte (N. C.) News, May
5, 1948, p. 4-A, col. 1; Frank, supra at 23 ("Assume that the doctrine of the...
cases is that a state court may not by its decree achieve a discriminatory result
which a state could not order by direct legislative action. It would then follow
that whatever would be a violation of constitutional rights if done by statute is
also a violation of constitutional rights if done by decree . . . it can rationally
follow that the entire realm of common law interpretation by a state will be
subject to federal judicial review. It is doubtful that the Court meant to go

so far. .. ").

Equal Protection: Enforcement by state courts is a denial of the equal pro-

tection of the laws because

".

.

. freedom from discrimination by the States in

the enjoyment of property rights was among the basic objectives sought to be
effectuated by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. That such discrimination has occurred in these cases is clear. Because of the race or color of these
petitioners they have been denied rights of ownership and occupancy enjoyed as a
matter of course by other citizens of a different race or color." Shelley v.
Kraemer, supra, at 845. On the question why racial segregation laws applicable
to public education and public accommodations are constitutional, when racial

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 27

eral court is a violation of the Civil Rights Act of 18664 and is contrary
to the public policy of the United States.'
Residential segregation based on race or color has developed with
the extensive migration of Negroes from the southern to the northern
and western regions of the nation; 6 and with the pronounced shift
segregation is not permitted in residential areas by judicial enforcement of racial
restrictive agreements or by state and municipal legislation [Buchanan v. Warley,
245 U. S. 60 (1917)] see McGovney, supra note 2, at 25-29; Taylor, supra, at
93; 46 MicH. L. REv. 639 (1948); PREJUDICE AND PROPERTY 45, 94 n. 26 (summary
of brief for the United States as Ainicus Curiae, Shelley v. Kraemer, Hurd v.
Hodge, 68 Sup. Ct. 836, 847 (1948). In searching for an answer it was said,
"The relevant point is that part [of the 14th Amendment] which says 'No State
shall make or enforce any law. . . .' If the Court hews to the line of the 14th
Amendment, it will inevitably follow that there can no longer be any State laws
or enforcement of laws against Negroes' . . . participating in the community
life on the basis of full social equality. Which is to say, in fact and in short, to
subject the long standing customs of the South and the relations of both races
in the South to a distortion which would crack both wide open. . . . We are
very much afraid that the Court's decision confronts the people of the South,
both white and colored, with the most critical questions." Editorial, A Blow to
Southernt Customs, supra. The decisions have been acclaimed as a "blow to
segregation" by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People,
News and Observer (Raleigh, N. C.), May 4, 1948, p. 13, col. 3; and by other
groups, N. Y. Times, May 4, 1948, p. 2, col. 3. This effect was recognized by
Noel Yancey, N. C. Segregation Laws Under Attack, Charlotte (N. C.) News,
May 5, 1948, p. 12-A, col. 1 ("...
another segregation practice lost its props this
week.").
14 STAT. 27 (1866), 8 U. S. C. §42 (1940), "All citizens of the United States
shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white
citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property."
'Enforcement of the agreements by a federal court would be contrary to the
public policy of the United States because "We cannot presume that the public
policy of the United States manifests a lesser concern for the protection of such
basic rights against discriminatory action of federal courts than against such
action taken by the courts of the States." Hurd v. Hodge, 68 Sup. Ct. 847, at
853 (1948). No court in the United States, with the possible exception of a
Federal Circuit Court in California in the Gandolfo case, supra note 3, has held
that racial restrictive agreements are void because contrary to the public policy of
the United States. The Supreme Court has consistently refused to consider the
argument. See Cornish v. O'Donoghue, 30 F. 2d 983 (App. D. C. 1929), cer.
denied, 279 U. S. 871 (1929). The same argument was presented in the Racial
Restrictive Agreement Cases, in the brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae.
PREJUDICE AND PROPERTY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 68-74. Compare Re Drummond
Wren [1945] 4 D. L. R. 674 (Ont. H. C.), 59 HAiv. L. Rav. 803 (1946) (using
a worldwide concept of public policy to overcome local prejudices) with Re Noble
and Wolfe [1948] 0. R. 579 (restrictive agreement against Jews and Negroes,
etc., not void as being contrary to public policy. ". . . Courts must not 'roam
unchecked in the field occupied by that unruly horse, public policy."').
'In 1940 74.4% of all non-whites lived in the Southern States. By 1947 this
had been reduced to 63.5%. In 1940 about 10 million Negroes lived in the
South; in 1947 about 9y2 million lived there-a loss of 500,000 in seven years.
CuRRENT POPULATION REPoRTs, Bureau of the Census, Series P-20, No. 9, Jan.
19, 1948. During the same period the Negro population in the San Francisco
Bay Area increased 227%, with an estimated 64,000 Negroes living there in 1947.
THE NEGao HANDBOOx 27 (1946-1947).
During the years 1935-1940 North Carolina suffered a net migration loss of 5,000 whites and 10,000 non-whites. Color
and Sex of Migrants, Internal Migration 1935-1940, Special Reports, Bureau of
the Census, Table 9, p. 19, Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940. From
1940 to 1947 net migration loss of North Carolina was 400,000. Current Population Reports, Bureau of the Census, Series P-25, No. 2, Table 2, p. 6, Aug. 9,
1948.
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among Negroes from the rural to the urban areas in the South.7 Fear
of economic loss8 and racial prejudice9 caused the inhabitants of white
neighborhoods to seek lawful means to prevent the invasion of their
residential areas by Negroes.
Racial segregation ordinances were adopted in a number of cities,
largely in the South;1° but were declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1917.11 Thus, the racial restrictive
Migration of non-whites within the South is not as extensive as non-white
migration outside the area. Rapid urbanization of the Negro in the South is
deterred by (1) lack of economic opportunity in industrial jobs, coupled with
housing shortages, and (2) increasing opportunities in agriculture caused by the
large white urbanization. CURRENT PoPuLAiox REPORTS, Bureau of the Census,
Series P-20, No. 14, April 15, 1948; FARMS or NoN-WHiTE FARM OPERATORS,
etc., Bureau of the Census, Series NA No. 14, March 4, 1948. North Carolina's
non-white farmers increased from 60,000 in 1940 to 74,000 in 1945; the value of
buildings and land increased 67% during same period, or from $113,000,000 to
$189,000,000. Ibid. Even in rural areas ". . . there is residential segregation, but
it does not affect the housing conditions of Negroes as much as their prospects as
farmers ....
In general only 'acceptable' Negroes are allowed to buy land, and
there is great reluctance toward selling the more desirable property to any Negro."
STma, THE NEaR's SHARE 200 n. 11 (1943).
Invasion of white neighborhoods by Negroes is alleged to cause immediate
depreciation in property yalues. Investigation of this allegation establishes the
view that if the depreciation is immediate as it respects the white owners, it is
also temporary. Kahen, supra note 3, at 202 n. 20. "Sacrifice sales" by the white
owner may work for the benefit of the Negro, STERNR , op. cit. supra note 7, at
209; or may have the opposite result, MANGUM, op. cit. supra note 2, at 139;
U. S. News & World Report, May 14, 1948, p. 23, col. 3. Nevertheless, "Rightly
or wrongly, the Negro has always been regarded as a menace to real estate values," STERNER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 314; 2 SImEs, FUTURE INTERESTS §459
(p. 301) (1936).
See Brief for Appellants, p. 11, Vernon v. R. J. Reynolds
Realty Co., 226 N. C. 58, 36 S. E. 2d 710 (1945) ("A large area of valuable
real property in Winston-Salem is under the blight of a covenant that restricts
against its ownership or occupancy by negroes. Because the area is surrounded
by ex.tensive areas exclusively occupied by negroes, every part of the restricted
area is valueless except for itse and occupancy by negroes." [Emphasis supplied.]
" MANGUM, op. cit. supra note 2, at 138 (aversion of white people toward living
in close proximity to Negroes) ; 2 SIMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS 460 (1936) (there
is a strong desire to prevent the inroads of members of certain races in particular
residential areas); STERNER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 201 n. 12, concerning poll
taken by Fortune Magazine where from 77% to 87% of the informants in various
sections of the country were in favor of residential segregation of Negroes, based
either on legal provisions or on social pressure--only 10o to 19% were against
racial residential segregation; Kahen, supra note 3, at 202; 46 MIcH. L. REv. 654,
661 (1948) (". . . the courts seem to feel that the element of prejudice predominates.") ; STERNER, id. at 202 (It should be noted ". . . that housing segregation.
unlike certain other segregative practices, is as prevalent in northern communities
having a heavy Negro population as in the South. Northern communities which
boast of the fact that they have no legal segregation actually may have at least
partial segregation in regard to schools, hospitals, and other similar institutions
as a consequence of their housing segregation."). The current housing shortage
has made the problem acute, Taylor, supra note 3, at 83.
"0The evolution of the racial restrictive zoning legislation is traced in: JoHItSON, PATrmums OF NEGRO SEGREGATION 173-176 (1943); STERNER, op. cit. supra
note 7, at 206-209; probably the most thorough discussion can be found in MANGUM, op. cit. supra note 2, at 138-147.
"Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60 (1917) commented on in 3 CORN. L. Q.
280; 18 COL. L. REv. 147; 31 HARv. L. Rxv. 475; 27 YALE L. J. 393 (1918). The
decision did not keep Winston-Salem, N. C., from adopting residential segregation
plans as part of a general zoning ordinance in 1930. The North Carolina Supreme
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agreement which had been developing' 3 as a subsidiary legal device
was selected as best suited for carrying out racial residential segregation.
The state and federal courts generally held such agreements valid
and enforceable. 14 In some jurisdictions a distinction was made between restrictions against the conveyance of the legal title to and restrictions against the use or occupancy by a member of the excluded
class. 15 Constitutional questions were usually dismissed with a stateCourt declared it unconstitutional in Clinard v. Winston-Salem, 217 N. C. 119,
6 S. E. 2d 867 (1940). This was Winston's second attempt. In 1912 the Board
of Aldermen of Winston, N. C. (now Winston-Salem), adopted a racial segregation ordinance. The North Carolina Supreme Court declared it void because the
general public policy of the state was to discourage emigration of Negro labor,
and the ordinance would have the opposite result. State v. Darnell, 166 N. C.
300, 81 S.E. 338 (1914).
'"
In form the agreements restrict the conveyance of the legal title to a member of the excluded group, or the use of or occupancy by such a person, or both
ownership and occupancy. The restriction is found in deeds or written agreements. It may be cast as a covenant or a condition subsequent, or a combination
of the two. Some agreements are limited in time, others are not. For classes of
person excluded see note 2 .sipra. The principal cases are illustrative of the various
types of agreements, see note 1 supra; Note, 162 A. L. R. 180 (1946) (cases collected on various types and the distinctions indulged in by the courts) ; PaEJUDICE
AND PROPERTY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 11.
"E.g., illustrative uses of the restrictive agreements prior to Buchanan v.
Warley, 245 U. S. 60 (1917): Hurd v. Hodge, 68 Sup. Ct. 847 (1948) (deed
executed in 1906 in the District of Columbia); in St. Louis, Mo., home of
petitioner in Shelley v. Kraemer, 68 Sup. Ct. 836 (1948), the use of the agreements began about 1910, LONG AND JOHNSON, PEOPLE VS. PROPERTY 12 (1947).
The agreement in Shelley v. Kraemer, supra, at 838 was signed Feb. 16, 1911;
Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 573, 205 S.W. 217 (1918) (deed executed in 1905) ;
widespread use of the racial restrictive agreement did not develop until the 1920's,
LONG AND JOHNsON, op. cit. mupra, at 13. Taylor, supra note 3, at 83 ("Today
[1947] the restrictive covenant has flourished like the greenbay tree in a soil made
fertile by fear of economic loss, irrational race hatred and the current housing
shortage.").
" E.g., cases collected in Notes, 162 A. L. R. 180 (1946) supplementing 114
A. L. R. 1237 (138), 66 A. L. R. 531 (1930) and 9 A. L. R. 120 (1920); McGovney, supra note 2, at 5; Kahen, supra note 3, at 198; Taylor, supra note 3,
at 80; PREJUDICE AND PROPERTY, op. cit. supra note 3; Brief of the American
Jewish Congress as Ainicus Curiae, Shelley v. Kraemer, Hurd v. Hodge, 68 Sup.
Ct. 836, 847 (1948).
"Holding a restriction against sale or lease illegal: Foster v. Stewart, 134
Cal. App. 482, 25 P. 2d 497 (1933) ; Porter v. Barrett, 233 Mich. 373, 266 N. W.
532 (1925) ; White v. White, 108 W. Va. 128, 150 S. E. 531 (1929) ; Williams
v. Commercial Land Co., 34 Ohio L. Rep. 559 (1929). But California, Michigan
and West Virginia hold that a restriction against use or occupancy is a legal restraint: Stone v. Jones, 66 Cal. App. 2d 264, 152 P. 2d 19 (1944); Shulte v.
Starks, 238 Mich. 102, 213 N. W. 102 (1927); White v. White, supra (dictum).
Such a distinction has been criticized by McGovney, supra note 2, at 8 n. 17,
where he contends that covenants against ownership or occupancy are technical
restraints on alienation, and that the courts must determine that the restraint
is so substantial as to be an illegal restraint. He criticizes Professors Tiffany
and Simes for accepting the fallacious assumption that technically the covenant
is not a restraint on alienation, see 5 TnFrANY, REAL PROPERTY §1345 (3d ed.
1939) ; 2 SimEs, FUTURE INTERESTS §460 (1936). North Carolina does not make
such a distinction. Phillips v. Wearn, 226 N. C. 290, 295, 37 S. E. 2d 895, 897
(1946) ("Therefore, not by virtue of a general plan or scheme, but by the agreement, the parties hereto have created a restrictive covenant [against ownership
or occupancy by Negroes] which is valid and enforceable between the parties.") ;
other North Carolina cases on racial restrictive agreements: Vernon v. R. J.
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ment that the prohibitions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
refer only to federal and state action and not to agreements of private
individuals."" And so they do, but it is the court enforcement of the
private agreements that is now banned as government action.
The creators of the unconstitutional racial zoning ordinances 17 and
the unenforceable racial restrictive agreements are today searching
for new plans that will keep certain neighborhoods "exclusive and
restricted."'' 8
The Supreme Court's "valid but not enforceable" doctrine 9 does
not settle the questions of court enforcement of cash deposits or bonds
given to secure the performance of agreements not to transfer the restricted property to one of the excluded persons.2 0 It is certain that
Reynolds Realty Co., 226 N. C. 58, 36 S. E. 2d 710, (1946) ; Eason v. Buffaloe,
198 N. C. 520, 152 S. E. 496 (1930). That such agreements are, however, common in North Carolina is public knowledge. News and Observer (Raleigh, N. C.),
May 4, 1948, p. 1, col. 6. Such agreements are frequently found in the North

Carolina reports in cases on covenants in general.
"0The courts missed the point that it is not the validity of the agreement but
federal court that is questioned. See note 3 supra.
state
the : enforcement
supra.
11, or
See notes 10byand
18 U. S. News and World Report, May 14, 1948, p. 22, col. 1 et seq. It is
interesting to read what real estate men in Greensboro, N. C., had to say about
the decisions in the principal cases: "Little Effect Expected Here-Real Estate

Agents Comment on Ruling. Most of the real estate dealers said present practices and customs in regard to white and Negro property sales will continue....
'For two or three years now we have been seeing a section in South Greensboro
gradually purchased by Negroes. It was inevitable because the section was adjacent to Negro residential areas,' a spokesman for the realtors said. . ....
Evidently questioned as to whether or not there would be a mass movement of
Negroes into white areas anytimd soon, one answered, "It's a long way from us"

Another replied, "We're not likely to be bothered by requests from Negroes to
buy property in sections like, say, Irving Park or Starmont. In the first place
property owners hardly would sell to Negroes, and in the second place, the
Negroes couldn't afford to buy such property." [Italics added.]

Asked, perhaps,

if he expected "trouble," one agent stated, "About the only trouble we could
expect is not from present residents but from some out-of-town person who would
try to make a 'test' case of the matter." Greensboro (N. C.) Daily News, May
4, 1948, p. 1, col. 4 and p. 3, col. 1.
10 While "valid but unenforceable" agreements are known in other fields of
the law, e.g., in cases affected by Statutes of Fraud and Statutes of Limitations,
they are believed to be distinguishable from the principal cases because of the
objectives of their unenforceability and the lack of conflict between the agreements
and social policy.
0 "Racial restrictive agreements still can be written into deeds, and signers
can be required to deposit cash or give bond, as a guarantee that they will abide
by its terms. . . . Thus, if the restrictive covenant is violated by one of the
signers, he may be penalized through forfeiture of the cash he deposited when
he signed the covenant. Whether the courts will uphold such a forfeiture, however, still is considered an open question. One other weakness of this plan, from
a practical standpoint, is that many householders do not have money to deposit
for such a purpose. Even where deposits are made, some signer may find it
profitable to forfeit the cash he has put up, in order to take advantage of an
exceptional offer from a member of a racial group barred under the covenant's
terms." U. S. News & World Report, May 14, 1948, p. 22, col. 2. In Hurd v.
Hodge, 68 Sup. Ct. 847 (1948) the covenant provided for forfeiture of $2,000
penalty on breach. The Supreme Court did not consider allowing recovery of
the penalty. The case was reversed and not remanded. See 46 MicH. L. REv.
978, 979 (1948).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

courts will not be permitted to enjoin a breach of the racial restrictive
2
agreement or to cancel a conveyance to a member of the excluded class, '

but is it possible to award damages for the breach of such an
agreement ?22
Perhaps some state courts, in attempts indirectly to enforce racial
restrictive agreements, will hold that a determinable fee, where the special limitation provides for the exclusion of unwanted groups, can be
28
distinguished from the type of agreements in the principal cases.
21 "Enforcement of the restriction is usually by a neighboring landowner who
is a party to such a recorded agreement, or who may assert an interest in the
restriction under the rules normally governing covenants running with the land.
Almost invariably the relief requested is the removal of the excluded occupant, or
injunction against his entry, and, where sales restrictions have been violated, cancellation of the offending deeds." PREJUDICE AND PROPERTY, op. cit. supra note 3,
at 12. Enforcement has been refused on equitable grounds when infiltration of the
Negroes causes the landowners to seek equitable relief from a "white elephant."
McGovney, mspra note 2, at 12-14; Note, 162 A. L. R. 180, 187 (1946). In Vernon
v. R. J. Reynolds Realty Co., 226 N. C. 58, 36 S. E. 2d 710 (1946) an action
was brought for equitable relief against the "burden" of restrictive covenants in
deeds to property in "Skyland," a residential section in Winston-Salem, N. C.
Within recent years the whole surrounding area for a depth of a quarter-mile had
been acquired by Negroes. The defendants' (white owners who wanted to keep
the covenants) demurrer was sustained below; held affirmed, the changed conditions
outside the development afford no grounds for relief.
22 The recovery of damages has not usually been the relief sought.
See note
21 supra. But in Eason v. Buffaloe, 198 N. C. 520, 152 S. E. 496 (1930) the
defendant, owner of a tract of land which he proposed to subdivide into residential lots, sold some of the lots to the plaintiff and contracted with him that all
remaining lots, when sold, would be conveyed by deeds containing restrictions
against the sale to or occupancy by any Negro. The plaintiff was held entitled
to maintain an action for damages ($2,000 alleged) upon the defendant's subsequently conveying some of the lots to the State School for the Blind and Deaf
by deeds not containing either of the promised restrictions. The School had
announced its purpose to erect and maintain on the lots a school for Negroes.
Now that the Supreme Court of the United States has ruled that such agreements are not enforceable by injunction, it seems probable that when presented
with the question of damages for breach the Court will follow through. An
option to purchase which does not conform to the time requirements of the Rule
against Perpetuities cannot be enforced under the doctrine of specific performance. Damages for breach of the option contract are allowed, however, in England-not so in America, and rightly so, Note, 162 A. L. R. 581, 591 (1946);
S mEs, op. cit. supra note 9, §512. If the grantee is free to convey the property
to whomever he pleases, but is subject to a suit for damages, or the threat of
such a suit with the possibility of judgment rendered against him, then he is
deterred from conveying because of the fear and/or the expense and trouble of
defending such an action. In effect the threat of a suit for damages would lend
the "full panoply of state power" to the practical effectiveness of the racial
agreement. The Supreme Court should not allow an action in law for damages
to accomplish for all practical purposes what it has ruled an action in equity for
injunctive relief cannot accomplish.
23 Technically
such a distinction exists. In a fee on condition subsequent
[one type of agreement found in deeds, see Shelley v. Kraemer, 68 Sup. Ct. 836

(1948)

where a condition "attach(ing) to the land" was used] ".

.

. the words

which provide for the termination of the estate on a contingency are not regarded as a part of the original limitation of the estate, but are considered to
provide for the cutting off of the estate before its proper termination, in the case
of an estate on special limitation [determinable fee] the words of the contingency
are regarded as a part of the limitation itself, and so as not cutting off an estate
previously limited, but as merely naming an alternative limit to the duration of
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However, when a court is called upon to answer these questions it
should declare that determinable fees with such a limitation, forfeiture
of the land or the security, or the awarding of damages for breach of
24
agreement are equally banned as state action.
The effectiveness of other devices is dependent more on the private
manipulations of the law of real property than on questions of constitutionality. Membership plans, either in corporations or clubs, are
already in use.25 Requiring membership in such an organization as a
condition precedent to the individual ownership of real property, where
membership in the club or corporation is dependent upon the consent
of other stockholders or members, is not a valid condition. It is prob26
ably an unlawful restraint on the transfer of property and void.
Neighborhood approval agreements, where a majority of the five
nearest neighbors must approve the new occupant before the residence
can be sold or rented are in the same category as membership plans.
They are probably void.27
the estate." 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §217 (p. 380) 3d ed. 1939). In the fee
on condition subsequent the grantor retains a right of entry for condition broken;
in the determinable fee he has a possibility of reverter. For other distinctions as
to alienability of these rights, etc., see McCall, Estates on Condition and on Special Limitation in North Carolina, 19 N. C. L. REv. 334 (1941). This distinction
would necessarily be made in any of the American jurisdictions [about 20] recognizing the fee determinable. See 1 SIMEs, FuTuRE INTERESTS §178 n. 10 (1936) ;
1 TwFANY, REAL PROPERTY §220 n. 85 (3d ed. 1939) and cases collected therein.
Practically, of course, there is no appreciable difference. See Goldstein, Rights
of Entry and Possibilities of Reverter as Devices to Restrict the Use of Land,
54 HAR . L. REv. 248 (1940).
-' See notes 20, 22 and 23 supra. The Court was explicit in its contempt for

racial restrictive agreements.

It is hardly possible that a firm stand against en-

forcement by injunction will be distinguished from enforcement by danage suits,
etc. To hold otherwise would be ". . . to make a mockery of the rest of his
[Vinson's] decision." Lathrop, The Racial Covenant Cases, [1948] Wis. L. REV.
508, at 526, 527.
" While the legality of such plans is open to question (see note 26 infra) it
is reported that "Meanwhile, many real estate subdivisions probably will be
platted and sold in connection with golf clubs, tennis clubs, gardening clubs, and
a great variety of other clubs based on some common activity or interest." U. S.
News & World Report, May 14, 1948, p. 22, col. 3.
"' "In the United States, except in Kentucky . . . a condition or limitation in
a conveyance or devise in fee to the effect that the grantee or the devisee is not
to alienate except with the consent of some other person is void." SIMES, op. cit.
supra note 9, §461; TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 15, §1345. Accord as to directions not to alienate without consent of another: Schwren v. Falls, 170 N. C. 251,
87 S. E. 49 (1916). (consent of executor required before wife could dispose of
property left to her by will of husband). If a real estate corporation, in developing a new subdivision, conveyed property to buyers with a provision that a
neighborhood improvement association would be formed, and that said association
would have the power to appoint subsequent purchasers of that property, it has
been noted that this is no direct restraint on alienation. It is a purely collateral
power. The original buyer can dispose of the property, as can the association,
but the original buyer's alienation is subject to the association's appointment. See
SIMES, op. cit. supra, §461. Of course, the original buyer would probably consider the power of appointment in the association as a dangerous possibility; but
he may waive that danger because (1) he would be a member of the association
and (2) neighborhood uniformity would be achieved.
" The element of consent of another is the determinative point. See note 26
supra.
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Plans whereby a corporation owns title to property and leases it to
occupants, or where a "first-refusal" option plan is included in a neighborhood real estate "improvement" association are distinguishable from
the membership-approval plans and should be valid 28 if they meet
certain requirements specified hereinafter.
Repurchase options, or "first-refusal" options, in favor of the grantor
of real property, where the time for the exercise of the option is limited so as to conform to the requirements of the Rule against Perpetuities 29 are probably valid and enforceable.3 0 A price should be set
for the repurchase and included in the option ;31 but where the price is
so ridiculously low that to enforce the option would amount to an absolute restraint on alienation, the courts should favor the grantee and
32
declare the provision void.
The long term lease33 with conditions against assignment, subleasing
"When title remains in the corporation and property is leased to the occupant
the lessor's purpose is to protect his land and the law approves of that. SImEs,
op. cit. sutra, note 9, §466. Such a transaction is subject to the laws on landlord
and tenant. But when a fee simple estate, as distinguished from the above estate
for years, is given with a restraint against alienation except with the consent of
another, the grantor has no legally protected interest. In the lease plan the lessor
does have a legally protected interest.
When the grantor of a fee simple has the option to repurchase the property
from the grantee before he can sell to anyone else, the existence of the option
is not an unlawful restraint on alienation. It does not prevent the grantee from
selling, but rather aids the grantor in buying the property back. Sinms, op. cit.
supra, note 9, §462 (1936). This repurchase option plan could be successfully
employed where the holder of the option was a neighborhood real estate association. One of the difficulties with the option plan is that generally the grantee
desires to sell at a time that is not propitious for the grantor. The association
would spread that burden. See LONG AND JOHNSON, op. cit. supra note 13, at
39-55 (1947) for the various types of "neighborhood improvement associations."
"Future interests must vest, if at all, within a life or lives in being plus
twenty-one year and ten lunar months, American Trust Co. v. Williamson, 228
N. C. 458, 46 S. E. 2d 104 (1948) ; 27 N. C. L. REv. 158 (1948) ; SIMEs, Op. Cit.
supra, note 9, §§477-552.
" Note, 162 A. L. R. 581, 594 (1946). The practicality of options is questioned
in 46 MIcH. L. REV. 978, 979 (1948) (too expensive and a severe restraint on
title). The American Law Institute takes the position 'that such options are
subject to the Rule against Perpetuities. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §394 (1936).
Cf. Hardy v. Galloway, 111 N. C. 519, 15 S. E. 890 (1892) (option to re-purchase
"when sold" declared void).
" In Hardy v. Galloway, ibid., the deed contained a provision whereby the
grantors retained for themselves and their heirs and assigns, the right to repurchase the land "when sold2W' Court held that the provision was void because (1)
it fixed no price for the repurchase; (2) for uncertainty; (3) no time fixed for
the performance of the provision; (4) it was an unlawful restraint on alienation.
It appears that if the defects in (1), (2), and (3) were corrected the right to repurchase may have been sustained. Hardy v. Galloway, id. at 525, 15 S. E. at
890 (1892).
"Re Rosher [1884] L. R. 26 Ch. Div. (Eng.) 801 (price set in will was
£3,000-actual value at exercise of option was £15,000). This could be avoided
by placing a provision for "fair market value" at time of the exercise of the
option, rather than a stipulated price.
" E.g., Henderson v. Virden Coal Co., 78 Ill. App. 437 (1897) (lease for 999
years); Todhunter v. Des Moines, I. & M. R. Co., 58 Iowa 205, 12 N. W. 267
(1882) (lease for 999 years); Banks v. Haskie, 45 Md. 207 (1876) (lease for
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or alienation by the tenant and with a covenant for perpetual renewal 35
is probably the most practicable legal device available for maintaining
restricted neighborhoods, although in the past it has been used primarily
for commercial purposes.3 6 But even here the would-be purchaser must
balance the desirability of owning the property in fee simple absolute
37
against that of retaining the desired uniformity.
Restrictions against objectionable uses of land have been sustained. 38
3

4

ninety-nine years renewable forever). The longer the time the lease is to run the
greater the restraint, and the reversioner's interest to be protected would be of
less value; yet the courts have made no distinction as to the length of the term.
2 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS

§466 (1936);

GRAY, RULE AGAINST ALIENATION

§§101-103 (2d ed. 1895).
112 SIMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS §466 (1936). ("If land is leased for a term of
years, it is everywhere recognized that the landlord may insert a condition in the
lease to the effect that, on the tenant's alienation or on his alienation without
consent, his lease may be forfeited.")
" On covenants for perpetual renewal see 2 SimEs, FUTURE INTERESTS §511
(1936) (cases collected in note 75 at 375) ; Note, 3 A. L. R. 498 (1919) supplemented in 162 A. L. R. 1147 (1946) ; Thaw v. Gaffney, 75 W. Va. 229, 83 S. E.
983 (1914); 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §§406, 410 (3d ed. 1939). On renewal
provisions in leases and related subjects see Notes, 14 A. L. R. 948 (1921) (general provisions for renewal); 26 A. L. R. 1413 (1923) (what amounts to an
option to renew); 39 A. L. R. 279 (1925) (when covenants to renew should be
construed to be for perpetual renewal, an excellent annotation). Sometimes a
notice provision is placed in the lease. Notes, 99 A. L. R. 1010 (1935), 1 A. L. R.
343 (1919).
Land is frequently leased for the production of oil and gas, e.g., cases collected in Note, 3 A. L. R. 378 (1919). The long term lease has been used extensively in residential development in Maryland as a part of the ground rent
system.

ROBERT KRATOVIL, REAL ESTATE LAW §389 (1946)

("The chief char-

acteristics of the Maryland ground rent leases are: (1) the landowner leases the
land to the lessee for a period of ninety-nine years; (2) with a provision for
perpetual renewal of the lease from time to time as each ninety-nine year period
draws to a close, upon payment of a small sum of money called a renewal fine;
(3) the lessee agrees to pay a certain sum of money ... as ground rent; (4) and
the lease contains a provision that if the lessee make default in his ground rent
payments, the lessor may declare the lease void and evict the lessee. The lessee
also agrees to pay the taxes ... and they are assessed to (him).... In practical
economic effect, the relation of the lessee to the property is that of the owner
of the land, subject to the payment of annual rent and taxes. . . . The technical
relation between the owner of the rent and leaseholder is that of landlord and
tenant. Jones v. Magruder, 42 F. Supp. 193 [1941]").
17 By ".... taking a long term lease the tenant secures the sole use and possible
increase in value of the land for a long term of years, and, in some cases, forever,
without putting up any cash consideration, except perhaps, a security deposit. He
is thus enabled to place all his money in improvements or in his business ...
The lease throws upon the lessee practically all the burdens incident to ownership
of the land, such as payment of taxes, and assumption of loss due to decline in
land value, but confers on the lessee essentially all the benefits of ownership.
[Emphasis supplied.] . . . A lessee does not acquire the legal title. His interest
is . . . personal property. His wife . . . does not have dower in the leased

premises."

ROBERT KRATOVIL, REAL ESTATE LAW

§388 (1946).

""A restriction against the use of residential property as a residence differs
from a restriction against other uses such as that no intoxicants shall be sold on
the property. While the latter is a restraint on alienation it does not diminish
the vendability of the property sufficiently to be held an illegal restraint." McGovney, supra note 2, at 9 n. 17. However, a restriction against the sale of
liquor made by the common grantor of lots, and providing for forfeiture to the
grantor in case of any such sale, affects the property, unless removed or released,
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It has been suggested that in keeping with these attempts to secure
"high occupancy" standards a restriction against use or occupancy except by a college graduate 9 might be given a try. Without arguing
what practical benefit such a restriction would have on racial segregation, if any, it is most likely an unlawful restraint on alienation and
40
void.
All of these plans are subject to practical difficulties. Repurchase
options and long term leases attached to real property tend to restrict
severely the alienability of the land. The title is rendered less marketable.4 ' As a result, problems related to the financing and mortgageability of the property increase. Questions of the effect on inheritance,
wills, and trusts will deter many. On the other hand, such devices
will have a retarding effect on the possible danger to vested real estate
values created by the decisions in the principal cases. The plans can
be used readily in new residential "subdivisions." 42 Their worth in more
fully developed residential areas is questionable.
The Supreme Court has narrowed the possible legal plans for restricting the use of land to certain classes of persons. Even those suggested here, the repurchase option and the long term lease, if used
openly and notoriously as a subterfuge to carry out racial residential
from
segregation, could be made unenforceable by separating the form
43
the substance and revealing the real motive behind their use.
Regardless of the efficacy of the legal devices, one may expect an
increase in extra-legal programs dedicated to the maintenance of
44
economic45 and
racially segregated residential areas. Through social
and constitutes an encumbrance entitling the purchaser who was to receive a
merchantable title to refuse to take title. Genske v. Jensen, 188 Wis. 17, 205
N. W. 548 (1925). See Note, 51 A. L. R. 1460 (1927).
" U. S. News & World Report, May 14, 1948, p. 23, col. 1.
40 Courts have held that a condition permitting alienation to anyone but a
member of the testator's family is void. 2
41

Cf. 2 Sn&as,

FUTURE INTEREsTS

SiMEs,

FUTURE

INTERESTS

§459 (1936).

§459 (p. 301) (1936) (suggesting in favor

of a restraint against alienation to Negroes that "considering human prejudices

as they are, it often renders a piece of land more readily alienable rather than
less so.").
4" The trend of whites moving from the older areas into the new residential
subdivisions continues. During the past few years the racial restrictive agreement

is reported to have accompanied the development of many of the new low-cost
housing projects. See Greensboro (N. C.) Daily News, May 4, 1948, p. 1, col. 4;
N. Y. Times, May 4, 1948, p. 2, col. ? (over 75% of the new developments are
"covered"). The Negroes are moving into the former "white" neighborhoods.
Greensboro (N. C.) Daily News. Ibid.

"46 MICH. L. REv. 978, 979 (1948).

""Social forces" as used here expresses the accumulation of attitudes, fears,
prejudices, customs and traditions, and the searches for better living conditions.

A "snobbish" and "cool" attitude toward undesirable neighbors is a part of the
pattern. Popular Government, June 1948, p. 11, col. 2 (Institute of Govt., Chapel
The "aversion" toward Negroes' living in close proximity with
MANGUM, op. cit. supra note 3, at 138 (1940). See
STERNER, note 9 supra. As McGovney, supra note 2, at 21 put another problem,
"The question is ... purchase by a Negro from a c'illing seller ... or occupancy
Hill, N. C.).

whites is another factor.
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harassing
forces the sale of property in white neighborhoods to
Negroes will be retarded but not completely blocked. Such restraints
47
will gradually yield.
by a Negro who has bought from a willing seller." In the "better" residential
areas the "willing seller" is difficult to find. In the South there is a tacit understanding that such a thing "just isn't done." MANGUM, op. cit. supra note 3,
at 147; STERNER, op. cit. supra, note 7, at 208; Wyatt v. Adair, 215 Ala. 363, 110
So. 801 (1926) (the custom recognized). See Greensboro (N. C.) Daily News,
supra note 18 ("In the first place property owners hardly would sell to Negroes . . .").

The attitudes of the Negro must be considered.

STERNER, op. Cit.

supra note 7, at 201 reports that many Negroes may prefer to live in the Negro
areas, even if they do not like to be forced to do so. See note 49, infra. No case
found in North Carolina where a Negro has attempted to buy property from a
white man, where property was covered by a restrictive covenant. See Brief for
the Appellants, p. 3, Vernon v. R. J. Reynolds Realty Co., 226 N. C. 58, 36 S. E.
2d 710 (1945) ("Numerous negroes are desirous of purchasing lots in the development, but none will buy or offer to buy any lot until the restriction is annulled."
[Emphasis supplied.] Suit to remove restrictive covenant against Negroes as cloud
on title). Query: will the inclusion of these agreements in deeds continue to have
the same effect?
'"Private lending institutions and real estate agents or associations, interested
in preserving property values (see note 8 supra) exert pressure in ". . . blocking
areas of expansion for additional housing for Negroes and other minorities . . ."
playing a role that is ".

.

. finely drawn and enacted at a level of sophistication

and professional respectability.

It is a role which frequently is not discharged

with race as a controlling, central objective . . ." but nevertheless a ".... significant
and determining role...
." LONG AND JOHNSON, op. cit. supra note 13, at 56-72;
STERNER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 209; Popular Government, June, 1948, p. 11, col.

2; U. S. News & World Report, May 14, 1948, p. 23, col. 2. The ". . . traditional
real estate and financial practice of restricting Negroes and other racial minorities
to sharply defined neighborhoods .

. ."

was recognized in a statement by Raymond

M. Foley, Administrator of the Housing and Home Finance Agency, appearing
in PREJUDICE AND PROPERTY, Op. cit. supra note 3, at 24.

The housing policies

of the Federal Government lent support to the residential segregation of Negroes.
One of the recommended restrictions in the FHA Underwriting Manual (1938)
par. 980 g. reads: "Prohibition of the occupancy of properties except by race for
which they are intended." LONG AND JOHNsON, op. cit. supra note 13, at 69;
STERNER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 310-323. Recent reports that the FHA is con-

sidering a regulation refusing insurance on loans made by private institutions
where the conveyance to the property contains a racial restrictive agreement, U. S.
News & World Report, May 14, 1948, p. 50, col. 3, have been confirmed but no
definite action has been taken. The suggestions of FHA on this would carry great
weight. FHA, Seventh Annual Report, p. 22 (Dec. 31, 1940).
.... violence and intimidation play a large role in keeping Negroes out of
white-dominated areas ....
Bombings, racial propaganda, and mob violence have
been widely, if sporadically reported." STERNER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 209
(1943). "From July 1, 1917, to July 27, 1919, there were 24 arson-bombings
perpetrated against Negro homes in Chicago, while from May 1, 1944, to July 20,
1946, there were 46 such acts of violence." LONG AND JOHNSON, op. cit. supra note
13, at 73. On "Racial Tensions and Violence" in general, see id. at 73-85; MANGUM, op. cit. supra note 3, at 274-307; MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DrLEMMA 558-569

(1944). "I just want to say that the Supreme Court decision of yesterday
[Racial Restrictive Agreement Cases, supra note 1] did more to bring about a
revival of the Ku Klux Klan in the United States than anything else that has
been done in the last 40 years." John Bell Williams, Congressman from Mississippi, 94 Cong. Rec. 5389 (May 4, 1948). In addition to these acts and threats
of violence, harassment by police and other local authorities may be employed to
maintain residential segregation. U. S. News & World Report, May 14, 1948,
p. 23, col. 3. For a combination of these types of "applied force" read the story
of the Sojourner Truth Housing Riots in Detroit during the spring of 1942.
MYRDAL, op. cit. supra, at 568, 678, 1337 (1944) ; Life, March 16, 1942, pp. 40-41.
"' No segregation can be complete. With increased professionalizing of law
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It is obvious that the Court's rulings will not eliminate either the
attempts to continue racial residential segregation or the sociological
problems thereby created. 48 Nor will they cause any mass movement
of Negroes into the white neighborhoods. 49 Although the legal title
to property now covered by a racial restrictive agreement is not affected,
the marketable title has probably depreciated in value where invasion
by Negroes is imminent.50 For constitutional law purposes the decisions
are the most important of the year in terms of legal theory ;51 for the
Negro they remove another legal obstacle in his effort to secure the full
52
benefits of his American citizenship.
The Racial Restrictive Agreement Cases53 must be accepted for
what they are: policy-making decisions by the Court, though one may
question the making of national policy as a function of the Supreme
enforcement agencies the harrassing methods will become less effective.

REPORT

155 (1947). Economic interests will overcome personal prejudices when offers from Negroes to white property owners are too tempting. STERNER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 209. And "social
pressures" with their prejudices will gradually give way in the recognition of the
OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON Crvi,

RIGHTS

Negro's position as an American citizen.

".

.

. the broad social problem . . . is

both serious and acute . . . its right solution in the general public interest calls
for the best in statesmanship and the highest in patriotism ....
But . . . up to
the present no law or public policy has been contrived or declared whereby to
eradicate social or racial distinctions in the private affairs of individuals. And it
should now be apparent that if ever the two races are to meet upon mutually
satisfactory ground, it cannot be through legal coercion or through intimidation
of factions, or the violence of partisans, but must be the result of a mutual
appreciation of each other's problems, and a voluntary consent of individuals.
And it is to this end that the wisest and best of each race should set their course."
Chief Justice Groner in Mays v. Burgess, 147 F. 2d 869, 873 (App. D. C. 1945).
,' The correlation between poor housing on one hand and crime, disease and
social unrest on the other hand has been demonstrated so often by experts that no
emphasis is needed here. E.g., Justice Edgerton dissenting in Hurd v. Ho.dge,
162 F. 2d at 244 (App. D. C. 1947), reversed, 68 Sup. Ct. 847 (1948) ; PREJUDICE
AND PROPERTY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 12-17, especially at 14; STERNER, op. cit.
supra note 7, at 202; Kahen, supra note 3; MYRDAL, op. cit. supra note 46, at 376,
379, 623, 625, 1290 n. 36 (1944).
' The current housing shortage with its low vacancy rates, the very forces
creating residential segregation, in addition to the income, social and cultural
status identifications are factors that will prevent any mass movement. STERNER,
op. cit. supra note 7, at 201 n. 13 (1943) ; LONG AND JOHNSON, op. cit. supra note
13, at 106; "Little Effect Here," Greensboro (N. C.) Daily News, May 4, 1948,
p. 1, col. 4. See notes 8 and 9 supra.
o See note 8 supra.
Frank, The United States Supreme Court: 1947-1948, 16 U. oF Cal. L.

REv.

1, 22-23 (1948) ; see note 3 supra (state action).
" E.g., Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U. S. 373 (1946) (elimination of segregation
in interstate transportation) ; Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400 (1942) (Negroes'
right to serve on juries) ; Alston v. School Board, 112 F. 2d 992 (C. C. A. 4th
1940), cert. denied, 311 U. S. 693 (1940) (same pay for same work in public
schools); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60 (1917) (residential segregation by
state ordinance prohibited) ; Sipuel v. Board of Regents of Oklahoma, 68 Sup.
Ct. 299 (1948) (more stringent application of the "separate but equal" doctrine
in public schools); 46 MicH. L. REv. 639, 644 (1948) ; HENRY LED MOON, BAL.,
ANCE OF POWER-THE NEGRO VOTE 215-219 (1948).
3 68 Sup. Ct. 836, 847 (1948).
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Court of the United States.54 The Court has taken a step down the
road to social progress that no state court, 55 only one federal court, 56
no state legislature, 57 and not even the Congress of the United States58
has attempted.

One may praise

9

or condemn

0

the Court for its bold-

ness. Either view, however, must be reconciled with two hard facts:
(1) judicial pronouncements will not alone eliminate prejudices against
minority groups-only through the process of education 6' is that pos"' E.g., Chief Justice Walter Clark, of the North Carolina Supreme Court,
strongly argued that "policy" was the question to be determined by the people

through their representative assemblies and not by the courts. BROOKS, WALTER
CLARK-FIGHTING JUDGE 192-205 ("Government by Judges") (1944). It is interesting to note that the dedication of this book reads: "To the Supreme Court of
the United States which now reflects the views of Walter Clark." Today the
Court appears- to be most vitally concerned with at least one element of "public
welfare"-that of civil rights-and it has accepted the task of interpreting the
Constitution most favorably toward minority groups. Perhaps it is the "role"
of the Court to formulate policy, especially when no other agency of government
will undertake the challenge. See "The Role of the Supreme Court as a Guardian
of Civil Rights" REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S CoM mITEE ON CiviL RIGHTS 112
(1947). Cf. Speech of Congressman John E. Rankin, of Mississippi, "Protecting
the American People from the Supreme Court." 94 Cong. Rec. 5388 (May 4,
1948) (after the decisions in principal cases).
"5See note 14 supra. As evidence of a public policy in favor of racial residential segregation see note 5 supra.
" Gandofolo v. Hartman, 49 Fed. 181 (C. C. Calif. 1892) is the only federal
case to hold otherwise prior to these decisions.
""No state statutes have been found prohibiting the use of racial restrictive
agreements in connection with the ownership or occupancy of real property. Recent
attempts to have such agreements outlawed have failed in Illinois and Minnesota,
LONG AND JOHNSON, op. cit. supra note 13, at 99-100; and in New York, Taylor,
supra note 3, at 98.
"' The Congress is silent, or at least, was silent until the principal decisions.
On May 4, 1948, two Congressmen from Mississippi (Rankin and Williams) stated
their opinions on the Racial Restrictive Agreement Cases. 94 Cong. Rec. 5388
(May 4, 1948). Other references were made. Id. p. 5403, col. 2 (by Mr. Marcantonio of N. Y.) ; p. 5404, col. 1 (by Mr. Walter of Pa.); p. 5405, col. 2 (by
Mr. Devitt of Minn.).
" "The Supreme Court has handed down a momentous decision....
I think
we have taken a big step forward in assuring democratic rights in this country."
Eleanor Roosevelt, My Day, News and Observer (Raleigh, N. C.), May 6, 1948,
p. 4, col. 3. The decisions were "acclaimed" by leaders of Negro and Jewish
groups. N. Y. Times, May 4, 1948, p. 2, col. 2. See note 3 supra.
" In a one minute speech before the House of Representatives on May 4, 1948,
on the topic, "Protecting the American People from the Supreme Court," Mr. John
E. Rankin, Congressman from Mississippi said: "Mr. Speaker, there must have
been a celebration in Moscow last night; for the Communists won their greatest
victory in the Supreme Court of the United States on yesterday, when that once
august body proceeded to destroy the value of property owned by tens of thousands
of loyal Americans in every State in the Union by their anti-covenants decision...
[after referring to other acts of "destruction" by the Court]. . . . They now
attempt to reverse the laws of nature by their own edict and destroy the peaceful
relationships existing between different races in every State by outlawing the
restrictive covenants that have existed for more than 100 years. [Cf. with note
13 supra.] Which all adds up to the fact that white Christian Americans seem
to have no rights left which the present Supreme Court feels bound to respect....
Unless the Congress . . . turns back this tide of fanaticism then God save the
country," 94 Cong. Rec. 5388 (May 4, 1948). See Editorial, A Blow to Southern
Customs, Charlotte (N. C.) News, May 5, 1948, p. 4-A, col. 1.
"lThe decisions in the principal cases ".... may be a contribution to the educational process by which the Emancipation Proclamation may in some distant era
become a reality." Frank, supra note 51, at 26.
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sible; and (2) these prejudices with their fearful effects on our society
0
must be supplanted by an understanding tolerance.
0.

2

MAX GARDNER, JR.

Constitutional Law-Statutory Construction-Judicial
Determination of End of War
Last June, in Ludecke v. Watkins,1 the United States Supreme
Court interpreted the Alien Enemy Act. 2 In 1946 the Attorney Gen"2"A minority [including Dr. Frank P. Graham, President of the University
of North Carolina] of the Committee favors the elimination of segregation as an

ultimate goal but . . . opposes the imposition of a federal sanction. It believes
that federal aid to states for education, health, research and other public benefits
should be granted provided that the states do not discriminate in the distribution
of the funds. It dissents, however, from the majority's recommendation that the
abolition of segregation be made a requirement, until the people of the states involved have themselves abolished the provisions in their state constitutions and
laws which now require segregation. Some members are against the non-segregation requirement in educational grants on the ground that it represents federal
control over education. They feel, moreover, that the best way to ultimately end
segregation is to raise the educational level of the people in the states affected; and
to inculcate both the teachings of religion regarding human brotherhood and the
ideals of our democracy regarding freedom and equality as a more solid basis for
genuine and lasting acceptance by the peoples of the states." THE REPORT OF THE
PRESMnENT'S CoMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTs 166-167 (Washington, 1947).

"While

it is recognized that all barriers against the race cannot be eradicated overnight
by executive fiat, court decree, or legislative action, the Negro people of America
believe that it is the obligation of the government, of the labor movement, and of
all true progressives to take a clear, consistent, and unequivocal line against racial
discrimination and segregation. They believe that the objective of national policy
should be full equality for all citizens. And they have been encouraged in this
conviction by the report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights." HENRY
LEE MooN ("The Ultimate Objective"), BALANCE OF POwER-THE NEGRO VOTE,
p. 218 (1948).
One can only begin to grasp the scope of the issue raised by the Supreme Court
of the United States in the Racial Restrictive Agreement Cases when these two
statements are compared with excerpts from a speech made by Governor J. Strom
Thurmond (S. C.) at the Dixiecrat Convention in Jackson, Miss., during the
month of May, 1948: "All the laws of Washington and the bayonets of the Army
cannot force the Negro into their (Southern) homes, their schools, their churches
and their places of recreation and amusement." Quoted in Editorial, Charlotte
(N. C.) News, May 11, 1948, p. 4-A, col. 1; or with the following statement
from DAVID L. COHN, WH RE I WAS BORN AND RAISED 294 (1948): "Since the

deep-seated mores of a people cannot be changed by law, and since segregation is
the most deep-seated and pervasive of the Southern white mores, it is evident
that he who attempts to abolish it by law runs risks of incalculable gravity. There
are nonetheless whites and Negroes who would break down segregation by Federal fiat. Let them beware. I have little doubt that in such a case the country
would find itself nearing civil war." And further, at page 294: "Yet whatever
may be the disabilities worked upon Negroes and whites by segregation; whether
the fears that provoke it are reasonable or unreasonable; whether it is antidemocratic, anti-constitutional or anti-Christian, there is little chance, in my
opinion, that it will be obliterated in a foreseeable time. He who evades, beclouds,
or challenges the issue may do great harm to the whole American society."
'68
Sup. Ct. 1429 (1948).
2
REV. STAT. §40617 (1875), 40 STAT. 531 (1918), 50 U. S. C. §21 (1946)
("Whenever there is a declared war between the United States and any foreign
nation or government, or any invasion or predatory incursion is perpetrated, attempted, or threatened against the territory of the United States by any foreign

1949]
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eral, under authority from the President, ordered the removal of
Ludecke, a German alien enemy. This accorded with the supposed
power granted by the Alien Enemy Act. The Supreme Court, through
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in affirming a denial of a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus held: the Alien Enemy Act bars judicial review of an
executive order commanding the removal of an alien enemy; this power
is properly exercised through the Attorney General; the statute is not
offensive to the bill of rights; the President's summary power does not
cease with the cessation of actual hostilities. In a dissenting opinion
Mr. Justice Black opined that we are no longer at war with Germany
"in the sense contemplated by the statute."' 3
The Alien Enemy Act clearly specifies that the President's power
thereunder becomes available after he proclaims a Congressionally declared war, 4 but the Act does not indicate as clearly as do many other
emergency statutes, when the war power thus conferred is to terminate. 5
We can discover the Congressional intent6 underlying this Act by
nation or government, and the President makes public proclamation of the event,
all natives, citizens, denizens or subjects of the hostile nation or government ...
who shall be within the United States and not actually naturalized, shall be liable
to be apprehended, restrained, secured, and removed as alien enemies. The President is authorized, in any such event, by his proclamation thereof, or other public
act, to direct the conduct to be observed, on the part of the United States toward
the aliens who become so liable . . . and to establish any other regulations which
are found necessary in the premises and for the public safety.").
'Joined by Douglas, Murphy and Rutledge. In a separate dissent Mr. Justice
Douglas, joined by Murphy and Rutledge, argued that summary removal orders
are offensive to the bill of rights during war or peace.
• U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, §16; see, Prize Cases, 2 Black 635, 668 (U. S. 1863)
(constitutionally Congress alone can declare war. President cannot initiate or
declare war, but he can recognize existence of a state of war and resist force by
force.) ; Eagleton, The Formal Function of the Declaration of War, 32 Am. J.
INT'L L. 19 (1938) ; Savage v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 57 F. Supp.
620 (W. D. La. 1944) (plaintiff's death in Japanase attack on Pearl Harbor did
not result from war. At that time there had been no declaration of war.) ; Verano
v. Dougelis Coal Co., 41 F. Supp. 954 (M. D. Pa. 1941) (there can be a condition
of war, but no war in fact without a declaration thereof).
'See, Ludecke v. Watkins, 68 Sup. Ct. 1429, 1437 (1948) (in his dissent Black
states that this "statute, unlike statutes passed in later years, did not expressly
prescribe the events which would for statutory purposes mark the termination of
the 'declared war.'"); Report of Subcommittee No. 4, H. R. committee on the
Judiciary, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945), War and Emergency Statutes Classified
by Termination Provisions (termination provisions include, cessation of hostilities,
termination of the war, some period after termination of the war, the end of the
emergency, specified dates).
'2

SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY

CONsTRuCTION

315 (3rd ed., Horack, 1943) (the

law must be applied according to the spirit of the legislative body); Heydon's
Case, 3 Co. Rep. 72, 76 Eng. Repr. 637 (1584) (Lord Coke formulated the rules
for the "sure and true interpretation" of statutes. "[1] What was the common
law before the making of the act; [2] What was the mischief and defect for
which the common law did not provide; [3] What was the remedy the Parliament
hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth; [4] The
true reason of the remedy."). See, United States v. City of San Francisco, 310
U. S. 16, 20 (1939) ; Federal Trade Commission v. Ralodam Co., 283 U. S. 643,
650 (1930) ; Standard Oil Co. of N. J. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 50 (1911) ;
Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., 196 U. S. 1, 20 (1904); American Net and
Twine Co. v. Worthington, 141 U. S. 468, 474 (1891).
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referring to the debates which preceded its passage in July 1798.7 MvIr.
Otis, the chief Federalist sponsor of the bill, stated that the Act was
necessary unless Congress was "disposed to suffer a band of spies to
be spread through the country .. .who, in case of the introduction
of any enemy into our country, may join them in their attack upon us,
and in their plunder of our property." 8 He later said, "in time of tranquility, he should not desire to put power like this into the hands of the
executive." 9 Mr. Gallatin, the leading Republican opponent, finally supported the bill as a security measure.1 0 The Act, as passed, specifically
grants the President summary powers to remove alien enemies only in
times of immediate danger. It states that the President's power shall
be effective when "any invasion or predatory incursion is perpetrated,
attempted, or threatened against the territory of the United States...."11
This verbiage aims precisely at protection against direct or indirect attack on the United States.
We next consider the public policy background, since any interpretation of the Act must be made within its confines. 12 It is necessary
that nothing impair the power to wage war successfully."8 It is quite
clear that during a war the President must have authority to act quickly
without technical hindrances. 1 4 In 1799, commenting on the Alien Acts
and enemy aliens generally, justice Iredell declared that on the eve of
war it was common to order alien enemies away'5 as protection against
the eighteenth-century equivalent of a potential fifth column. The Chief
Executive is in the most advantageous position to know who will endanger us. Disclosure of this information to the public during crucial

I

BASS=-r, THE FEDERALIST SYSTEM (1906) ; 2 MCMASTER, A HISTORY OF THE
PEOPLE OF. THE UNITED STATES (1885); 1 ScHouLER, HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERIcA (1880); BASSETr, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

(3rd ed. 1939).

88 ANNALS OF CONG. 1791 (1798).

O-Ibid.

'Old.at 2035 (1798).

" REv. STAT. 40617 (1875),
12 Cf. Walton v. Cotton, 19

40 STAT. 531 (1918), 50 U. S. C. §21 (1948).

How. 355 (U. S.1856) ; Church of the Holy Trin-

ity v. United States, 143 U. S.457 (1891) ; Feitler v. United States, 34 F. 2d 30
(C. C. A. 3d 1929) aff'd, 281 U. S.389 (1929); Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis.

327, 133 N. W. 209 (1911).
"See, Citizens Protective League v. Clark, 155 F. 2d 290, 294 (App. D. C.
1946)

(Alien Enemy Act constitutional and effective until the state of war has

ended).
14 See, Ex parte Graber, 247 Fed. 882, 885 (N. D. Ala. 1918) (application of
Alien Enemy Act in time of hostilities) ; 3 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1721 (2d
ed. 1945) (a government at war is subject to few restrictions in dealing with alien
enemies. The sovereign may take any action against them which it deems necessary for national security).

"Case of Fries, 9 Fed. Cas. 831, No. 5, 126 (C. C. Pa. 1799) ("Why is it

done, but that it is deemed unsafe to retain in the country, men whose prepossessions are naturally so strong in favor of the enemy that it may be apprehended that they will either join in arms, or that they will do mischief in his

favor.").
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hours through judicial record is inconceivable,' 0 therefore the statute
17
gives the President the summary powers of removal.
The act is not criminal. The alien enemy is being removed in order
to prevent him from committing a crime.'
The removal is not punishment, yet it has been said that removal, like deportation may result in
the loss "of all that makes life worth living." 19 "This possibility
approaches probability when removal is to Germany, a country ravaged
'20
by war and occupied by four conquering armies.
During peacetime, aliens get the "same protection and the same redress for injury" we give our citizens. 2 1 No alien may be deported
without the right to have counsel, to hear charges against him, and to
examine witnesses. 22 This guarantee of due process must be limited in
wartime. The Alien Enemy Act not only limits these protections but
entirely eliminates many of them. As it is necessary that nothing impair
the power to wage war successfully it is also necessary that emergency
powers granted constitutionally in wartim0 3 do not impair the safeguards of freedom and liberty erected by the Constitution for times of
peace.24 Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the principal case cites Woods v.
Miller,25 which deals with the Housing and Rent Control Act of 1947,
as authority for continuing the President's power under the Alien Enemy
Act. Since greater weight should be assigned to personal liberty than
" See, Citizens Protective League v. Clark, 155 F. 2d 290, 294 (App. D. C.

1946).

'1See, Lockington v. Smith, 15 Fed. Cas. 760, No. 8,448 (C. C. Pa. 1817)
(object of act "was to provide for the public safety, by imposing such restraints
upon alien enemies, as the chief executive magistrate of the United States might
think necessary, and of which his particularsituatiom enabled him best to judge."
[italics supplied]).
" Case of Fries, 9 Fed. Cas. 831, No. 5, 126 (C. C. Pa. 1799) ("... it is
ridiculous to talk of a crime, because perhaps the only crime . . . is . . . being
borr; in another country, and having a strong attachment to it. . . . [The alien
enemy] is not punished for a crime that he has committed, but deprived of
the power of committing one hereafter to which even a sense of patriotism may
tempt a warm and misguided mind... .
"See, Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276, 284 (1921).
"See, United States ex rel. Schlueter v. Watkins, 67 F. Supp. 556, 562 (S. D.
N. Y. 1946).
2' IV PROCEEDINGS, American Society of International Law 20 (1910)
(so said
Elihu Root, Secretary of State under Theodore Roosevelt).
-- See, Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135, 153 (1944) (relies on the rules of
the specific agency trying an alien for deportation. "These rules are designed
as safeguards against essentially unfair procedures.").
2" John Quincy Adams as quoted in United States v. Macintosh, 283 U. S. 605,
622 (1930) ("This power is tremendous; it is strictly constitutional; but it breaks
down every barrier so anxiously erected for the protection of liberty, property
and of life.").
" 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CoNsmucTiON 318 (3rd ed., Horack, 1943)
(where a statute tends to interfere or disrupt long established personal rights the
courts have been inclined to employ a restricted interpretation thereof) ; id. at 326
(statutes permitting summary proceedings sometimes operate harshly on the party
adversely affected. Thus the courts have been inclined to a narrow construction
of such legislation).
2 333 U. S. 140 (1948).
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to economic interests that decision, and others of the same ilk, cannot
be controlling here.
Therefore, it is important to determine whether we were at war or
peace within the contemplation of this act when the President's summary powers were exercised. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, like Lord Macnaughten in 1902,27 refused to recognize any period of time which is
neither wholly war nor wholly peace. It is submitted that, for the purposes of the Alien Enemy Act, there is an interval period between actual
hostilities and the "peace of Peace" during which the Act is not effective. Recently the Commonwealth Arbitration Court drew a bedevilled
analogy concerning the period immediately following actual hostilities.
"I believe that Christmas dinner will end with the grace said at the
conclusion of the meal. And even if the subsequent coffee and postprandial cigar can by tradition be included, I have never heard that the
washing up of the dishes used is regarded as forming part of the
meal."' 28 After the Spanish American War the Supreme Court insisted
that a state of war did not cease until the ratification of a peace treaty,29
but a federal court refused to impose a death penalty on a soldier who
deserted during the interval between actual hostilities 'and the signing
of the treaty of peace.30 On August 18, 1945, President Truman
issued an executive order in which he prescribed policies "arising out
of the transition from war to peace." 3'
In his message to Congress on
September 6, 1945, the President said, "The end of the war has come
imore swiftly than most of us anticipated . . .the time has not yet
'arrived, however, for the proclamation of the cessation of hostilities,
much less the termination of the war."' 2 The President envisioned an
interval period which was neither wholly war, nor wholly peace.
President Wilson, on November 11, 1918, speaking to the two
Houses of Congress concerning the acceptance by Germany of the
Armistice said, "The war thus comes to an end." The "state of war"
did not terminate until 1921 when Congress passed a joint resolution
to that effect.m In United States v. Hicks34 the court refused to
20 Note, Judicial Determinationof the End of War, 47 COL. L. REv. 255 (1947)
(assignment of greater weight to personal liberty then to economic interests has
become a thoroughly embedded principle of constitutional law); the majority
opinion also cites Fleming v. Mohawk Co., 331 U. S. 111 (1946) (deals with
the Office of Price Administration); Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251
U. 2S.146 (1919) (war-time Prohibition Act).
See, Janson v. Driefontein Consolidated Mines, Ltd., [1902] A. C. 484, 497.
"As quoted: E. A. D., Has World War II Ended?, 20 AusT. L. J. 2 (1946).
2 IHijo v. United States, 194 U. S. 315 (1904)
(damages for ship detained after
hostilities but before peace treaty).
"itnre Cadwaller, 127 Fed. 881 (Mo. 1904) (the treaty of peace had not been
arranged, but the war would not be further prosecuted. Among other indications
the United States commenced to disband its army).
"1Exec. Order No. 9599, 10 FFD. REG. 10155 (1945).
32H. R. Doc. No. 282, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
1142 STAT. 105 (1921).
" 256 Fed. 707 (W. D. Ky. 1919).
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penalize the defendant for violating a federal statute which was to be
effective "during the present war." The violation took place twenty
days after President Wilson's communication. Held: The acts of the
defendant were not committed within the true meaning of "during the
present war." Although a treaty of peace usually terminates war, "history shows many instances in which wars were terminated without any
treaty at all . . . a treaty is not essential to the actual ending of a
war . . . for reasons more or less publicly known no treaty of peace
has been made." The President's communication to the entire nation
showed "the fact of the actual termination of real war." The phrase
"during the present war . . . does not appear to be a case for technicalities but for facts."3 5
Generally an act of Congress or an executive proclamation is necessary to end a war for the purposes of applying a particular statute, unless otherwise specifically stated in the statute being considered. 36 But
the type of statute and the right affected have an influence on the
court's reaction to a war measure.3 7 Many statutes speak in terms of
specific termination dates but the Alien Enemy Act does not.
Further, Mr. Justice Frankfurter claims that if the powers of removal are not applicable after the "shooting war," since the act is not
a criminal statute, its effects would be completely nullified because deportation of alien enemies is impractical during the "shooting war."
Although deportation today contemplates sending the alien back to the
country from whence he came, the statute uses the word removal. In
1798, when the statute was passed, there were many parts of the world
to which the alien enemy could be removed during the "shooting war."
Therefore, merely because it is no longer practical to remove alien
enemies during a "shooting war," we cannot allow the power to remove
to become a power to punish. It becomes so when the removal is made
after the alien enemy is no longer dangerous.
It is submitted that the powers given by the Act cease when there
is no longer any danger of attack from the enemy. Generally that
would be after the actual cessation of hostilities, when the "shooting
stops"; when peace in fact, if not technically, exists. That interval
between the actual hostilities and the "peace of Peace" is peace in fact.
JOHN DAviD R ODER.
'United

States v. Switzer, 6 Alaska 223 (1920)

(uses U. S. v. Hicks as

authority).
"6Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U. S. 1 (1920); Hijo v. United States, 194 U. S.
315 (1903) ; The Protector, 12 Wall. 700 (U. S. 1871).
M Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries and Warehouse Co., 251 U. S. 146 (1919)
(cited by the majority in the principal case to uphold its decision that the act
of 1798 shall remain in effect until the "peace of Peace." Indicates that a statute
might be held invalid because the emergency which called it into being had ended,
despite the fact that a technical state of war continues).
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Courts-Federal Jurisdiction-Res Judicata Applied
to Determination of
Menashe v. Sutton1 had been instituted in a federal district court,
and Sutton's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction had been overruled. This ruling was not appealed. During the proceedings petitioner
had refused to testify, and consequently was committed for contempt.
In United States ex rel. Sutton v. Mulcahy,2 petitioner by habeas corpus
sought to reopen the issue of jurisdiction which had been determined in
Menashe v. Sutton. In its decision the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
held: even assuming that the district court had not had jurisdiction,3
in the absence of special circumstances, the lower court's determination
that it did have jurisdiction was immune from collateral attack. No
special circumstances were here found.
4
This decision extends the holding in United States v. Jaeger.
There the petitioner was denied habeas corpus because he had failed
to appeal the very order for violation of which he was committed for
contempt. Here the order which petitioner had violated was not even
appealable. 5 His error was in not appealing from the court's decision
that it had jurisdiction to hear the case, a decision prior to and only
indirectly related to the order which he violated. The two cases are
otherwise substantially similar. Neither has been reviewed by the Supreme Court. They raise the question whether res judicata should be
applied where the attack on jurisdiction, though technically collateral,
arises directly out of the original action.
It is now well established that res judicata applies to jurisdictional
as well as to other judicial determinations where the attack is by a subsequent unrelated action.6 Stoll v. Gottlieb7 applied it where the issue
171 F. Supp. 103 (S. D. N. Y. 1947).

2169 F. 2d 94 (C. C. A. 2d 1948).
'Jurisdiction depended on constitutionality of the amendment extending diversity of citizenship privileges to citizens of the territories and the District of
Columbia, 36 STAT. 1091 (1911), as amended, 54 STAT. 143 (1940), 28 U. S. C.
§41(1) (b) (1946). The amendment was held unconstitutional in National Mutual
Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 165 F. 2d 531 (C. C. A. 4th 1947), cert.
granted, 68 Sup. Ct. 746 (1948).
1117 F. 2d 483 (C. C. A. 2d 1941).
'Petitioner had applied for a stay of the order to testify pending appeal from
it, but the application was denied by the circuit court of appeals on the ground
that the order was interlocutory and hence not appealable. United States ex rel.
Sutton v. Mulcahy, 169 F. 2d 94 (C. C. A. 2d 1948).
'Angel v. Bullington, 330 U. S. 183 (1947) ; Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v.
Adkins, 310 U. S. 381 (1940); Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State
Bank, 308 U. S. 371 (1940); Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U. S. 66
(1940) ; Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165 (1938); cf. Baldwin v. Iowa State
Travelling Men's Ass'n, 283 U. S. 522 (1930) ; Dowell v. Applegate, 152 U. S.
327 (1893) ; Des Moines Navigation Co. v. Iowa Homestead Co., 123 U. S. 255
(1887). But cf. Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U. S. 348
(1920) (bankruptcy court declared insurance company an involuntary bankrupt in
spite of an express statutory exemption; held not res judicata, but null and void,
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of jurisdiction had been actually contested in the prior action, and
s
Chicot County Drainage Districtv. Baxter State Bank applied it where
the court had impliedly determined its jurisdiction by assuming to hear
the case. In both of these cases a bankruptcy court had determined that
it had jurisdiction to dispose of certain rights of bondholders under a
reorganization plan. Plaintiffs, though they had been parties to the
bankruptcy proceedings, had not appealed. Later when they tried to
raise the question of the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction in an independent unrelated action on the bonds, the Supreme Court held in both
cases that the prior determination of jurisdiction, though wrong, was
res judicata. These cases differ from the instant case in that here the
attack, although it arose in a petition for habeas corpus, and so, strictly
viewed, was a collateral attack, was from a practical standpoint sub9
sidiary to the action out of which it originated. Thus the rule of the
principal case extends res judicata a little further into the field of jurisdictional determinations than did previous decisions.
The court in the Sutton case emphasized that habeas corpus is still
available under exceptional circumstances even when the issue of juris0
This is in accord
diction has been determined and no appeal taken.'
with expressed views of the Supreme Court." It is not yet altogether
clear just what will be considered exceptional circumstances, as the
12
More
qualification has rarely been invoked in order to grant the writ.
though the company had cooperated with the trustee in bankruptcy throughout
his administration).
305 U. S. 165 (1938) (bankruptcy court released guarantor from liability on
corporate bonds, an act in excess of its jurisdiction).
308 U. S. 371 (1940) (jurisdiction of a corporate reorganization was based
on a statute subsequently held unconstitutional).
' In view of the close relation of the two actions, would it not be proper as
well as more consistent with the courts' express recognition of exceptions under
special circumstances, to consider them within the framework of a single action
and therefore apply law of the case principles instead of strict res judicata? The
practical result would be substantially the same, but law of the case, being a
practice of courts rather than a binding rule, allows the necessary flexibility without interfering with the usual absolute quality of res judicata. Messinger v. Anderson, 255 U. S. 436 (1911). The courts, however, have not discussed law of the
case in decisions on such actions.
"0United States ex rel. Sutton v. Mulcahy, 169 F. 2d 94, 96 (1948) ("Although
the writ may still be availed of, despite neglect to appeal, in exceptional cases, we
do not think the present is such a case.").
the rule is not so
" E.g., Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U. S. 19, 27 (1939) ("...
inflexible that it may not yield to exceptional circumstances where the need for
the 2remedy afforded by the writ of habeas corpus is apparent").
E.g., United States ex rel. Stabler v. Watkins, 168 F. 2d 883 (C. C. A. 9th
1948) (default judgment cancelling a citizen's naturalization papers was based on
jurisdiction gained by service of summons to a place ascertained to be his residence by hearsay affidavits only) ; Bowen v. Johnston, supra note 11 (jurisdiction
depended on whether the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction over territory ceded by Georgia, and conflicting state statutes had to be construed to determine the answer).
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often the courts have recognized the qualification only to point out that
exceptional circumstances do not exist.'8
One other limitation of the rule of the principal case might be implied from the fact that in the cases thus far decided where jurisdiction
was held res judicata in the face of a collateral attack arising directly
out of the original action, the issue of jurisdiction had been actually contested at the earlier stage. 14 The question is open whether a mere
assumption of jurisdiction without actual contest would be res judicata
when so attacked. The general rule is that res judicata applies as well
where an issue might have been contested as where it was a real issue.',
There is authority, however, indicating that whether or not jurisdiction
was actually contested would be a factor in determining whether or
not the circumstances were sufficiently exceptional to warrant allowing
collateral attack.16
United States v. United Mine Workers17 should next be considered,
because it, like the Sutton case, deals with contempt committed in the
course of proceedings to which defendant was a party where the defense was that the court had no jurisdiction. The court issued a temporary anti-strike injunction in order to preserve the status quo until
it could exercise its power to determine whether or not it had jurisdiction to make the order permanent. The injunction was violated.
The Supreme Court, in its opinion in the contempt prosecution, found
that the lower court had actually been within its jurisdiction, but stated
as an alternative holding that even if it had not actually possessed the
requisite jurisdiction to make the order, the court was entitled to
enforce obedience to the temporary injunction as the only means available to assure it the effective power to determine its own jurisdiction.
Therefore the court held that disobedience of the temporary injunction
was contempt without regard to whether or not the court had jurisdiction. The present case differs in that here there was no necessity
" Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174, 179 (1947) (". . the situations in which
habeas corpus has done service for an' appeal are the exceptions . . . habeas
corpus is increasingly denied in case an appellate procedure was available for
correction of the error." Here the petitioner had not appealed because of a prevailing view, founded on interpretation of a Supreme Court decision, that appeal
was not available under the circumstances. After the time for appeal had expired,
a later Supreme Court decision showed that the earlier interpretation had been
wrong. Habeas corpus denied; not exceptional circumstances).
" In Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U. S. 19 (1939), the issue was assumed without
actual contest, but since exceptional circumstances were found it is not clear what
significance would be given to the fact taken alone.

Angel v. Bullington, 330 U. S. 183 (1947), Note, 26 N. C. L. REv. 60 (1947);
Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U. S. 371 (1940).
" RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS, §10(2) (d) ("Among the factors appropriate to
be considered in determining that collateral attack should be permitted are . . .
the question of jurisdiction was not actually litigated."). But see id. §10(2) (d),
comment
(c).S. 258 (1947).
17
330 U.
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of preserving the court's power to determine its own jurisdiction; that
power had been exercised. Further, the nature of the case differs substantially from a labor injunction case, in which time is of the essence;
here no urgent necessity compelled the court to enforce the order regardless of whether or not it was based on proper jurisdictional facts.
Thus the Mine Workers case does not seem applicable to the circumstances of the principal case. It leaves open, so far as the Supreme Court
is concerned, whether res judicata should be extended to a collateral
attack on jurisdiction which arises directly out of the original action,
where no such necessity exists.
There is no doubt that the Sutton case represents a logical development in the line of cases which in the past decade have extended res
judicata into the previously exempt field of jurisdiction over the subject
matter.' 8 Jurisdiction as so used should be distinguished from the lack
of jurisdiction to issue a particular order which may result from developments in the course of the trial. It is confined to decisions by a court
on its initial jurisdiction to conduct the litigation. So construed the
extension of res judicata to jurisdictional determinations seems a wise
policy. It places no restraint on the use of c6llateral attack where there
19
has been no hearing which meets the requirements of due process.
Nor does it preclude collateral attack by a person not a party to the
20
original action, who had no right of appeal from the first determination.
It merely requires that a person who was a party to the original action
proceed in the orderly course of law with his appellate remedies in the
case of a jurisdictional determination just as he would be required to
do in the case of any other judicial decision. Use of habeas corpus to
attack a jurisdictional determination is eliminated unless there are exceptional circumstances outweighing the policy favoring cessation of
litigation. This appears reasonable, as there is no generally applicable
rule which requires special treatment for decisions on jurisdiction. The
requirements of justice are met when a defendant has had a trial with
all the protection afforded by the due process provision of the Constitution, before an impartial tribunal, and with full opportunity for
appeal. In the absence of exceptional circumstances there appears no
reason why, having acquiesced until the time for appeal had expired, a
See note 6 supra.
Towensend v. Burke, 68 Sup. Ct. 1252 (1948) (lack of counsel under circumstances which showed that defendant had been taken advantage of by the prosecution; habeas corpus granted) ; Wade v. Mayo, 68 Sup. Ct. 1270 (1948) (no counsel
for eighteen-year-old defendant who was unable to adequately represent himself;
habeas corpus granted).
20 Fetzer v. Johnson, 15 F. 2d 145 (C. C. A. 8th 1926). Quaere whether a
witness with a statutory right of appeal would be bound if he failed to exercise
that right?
'8
10
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person should be heard to complain that he was tried by the wrong
court.21
ELIZABETH

0.

ROLLINS.

Courts-Venue--Attempts to Limit Venue Provisions of the
Federal Employers' Liability Act
Congress has provided a special venue statute for cases arising under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act which permits the employee to
sue (1) at the residence of the defendant, (2) where the cause of action
arose, or (3) where the railroad is doing business.' Many employees
have used the third provision as a means of "shopping" for an advantageous forum, or as a means of forcing railroads to compromise
suits rather than defend in a forum which, although technically proper,
is highly inconvenient to the railroad. The railroads have attempted
to avoid the burdens of such suits by various means, the most recent of which has been a contract with the injured employee limiting
the venue. There had been a conflict in the district courts2 as to the
validity of this type of contract, but recently the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals decided that such an agreement is void under Section 5 of the
FELA as an attempt by the railroad to exempt itself from liability
under the Act.3 The court looked to the history of the special venue
provisions and concluded that they are an inherent part of the employer's liability. Thus, the latest device to narrow these troublesome provisions has failed.
It is important to note at the outset the purpose of the special venue
statute of the FELA. Originally the venue of actions under that Act
was governed by the general provisions applicable to federal courts. In
" There was a peculiarity in the Sutton case which has not been mentioned,
viz., the petition for habeas corpus was brought within the time allowed for appeal.
It would be rare that counsel would make such an error, but where, as here, it
occurs, it seems to penalize the petitioner unduly for his attorney's error in choice
of remedies to refuse to consider the jurisdictional objection because of the guise
in which it was introducd. See Circuit Judge Frank, dissenting in United States
ex rel. Sutton v. Mulcahy, 169 F. 2d 94 (1948) ("I see no reason why irrational
procedural formalism, judicial red-tape-ism, yielding injustice, should not be repudiated in the appellate process, when no statute stands in the way.").
'36 STAT. 291 §6 (1910), 45 U. S. C. §56 (1946).
2 Holding such contracts valid on the theory that venue is merely the place of
enforcing liability are: Roland v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 65 F. Supp. 630
(N. D. Ill. 1946); Herrington v. Thompson, 61 F. Supp. 903 (W. D. Mo. 1945);
Clark v. Lowden, 48 F. Supp. 261 (D. Minn. 1942); Detwiler v. Lowden, 198
Minn. 185, 269 N. W. 367 (1936). Holding such contracts invalid are: Krenger
v. Pennsylvania R. R., 8 F. R. D. 65 (E. D. N. Y. 1947) ; Fleming v. Husted, 68
F. Supp. 900 (S.D. Iowa 1946); Sherman v. Pere Marquette Ry., 62 F. Supp.
590 (N. D. I1. 1945) ("The beneficial effects of the statute should not be
whittled away by the courts by distinguishing between adjective and substantive
rights. . . ."); Peterson v. Ogden U. Ry., 110 Utah 573, 175 P. 2d 744 (1946).
Compare Porter v. Fleming, 74 F. Supp. 378 (D. Minn. 1947).
'Akerly v. New York C. R. R., 68 F. 2d 812 (C. C. A. 6th 1948).
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order to relieve the employees of the inconvenience and expense of
travelling to the residence of the defendant to bring suit, Congress added
to the Act the broader provisions for venue. When the employees used
these liberal provisions to bring suits in forums distant from the scene
of the accident or the residence of the parties, the courts sought, at the
instance of the railroads, to use their power to avoid such vexatious
litigation by compelling the plaintiff to select a more convenient forum.
The problem the courts faced was whether or not they had the power
to defeat the plaintiff's choice of forum when Congress had conferred
a special right upon the employee to sue there. Put more simply, had
Congress intended that the venue privilege under the FELA should be
an absolute right given the employee with which the courts could not
interfere ?
The contracts of the type in the instant case were a result of the
railroads' attempts to limit venue extra-judicially, inasmuch as they had
met with no success in attempting to invoke judicial methods. The
judicial method first attempted was the use of the injunction. Courts
of a state have the general equitable power to enjoin citizens of the
state from prosecuting vexatious suits in a foreign forum. But the
federal courts would not exercise such equitable power of injunction
where a FELA suit was begun in a federal court, either on the ground
of inconvenience to the defendant or that such suit would burden interstate commerce, since Congress has the right to place such incidental
burdens by jurisdictional statutes. 4 Nor may a federal court enjoin the
prosecution of an action in a state court because of Section 265 of the
Judicial Code. 5
In Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Kepner6 the Supreme Court decided
that a state court may not enjoin a suit under the FELA begun in a
federal court. This case followed the settled line of authority which
preceded it, 7 and it is not the actual decision that made legal history,
'Chesepeake & Ohio Ry. v. Vigor, 90 F. 2d 7 (C. C. A. 6th 1937) ; Baltimore
& Ohio R. R. v. Clem, 36 F. Supp. 703 (N. D. W. Va. 1941).
Now §2283 of the revised Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. C. S. §2283 (1948)
(prohibits federal courts, with certain exceptions, from granting an injunction to
stay proceedings in a state court-see note 27 infra). Southern Ry. v. Painter,

314 U. S. 155 (1941), reversing 117 F. 2d 100 (C. C. A. 8th 1941).

The Circuit

Court of Appeals held that §262 of the Judicial Code [now §1651(a), 28 U. S.
C. C. S. §1651(a) (1948)1 which allows a court to issue any writ necessary to
protect its jurisdiction gave the federal court power to enjoin an action in the
state court to obtain injunction restraining prosecution of suit in federal court.
In Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Schendel, 292 Fed. 326 (C. C. A. 8th 1923) the
court issued an injunction on the same facts. The Supreme Court in the Painter
case did not mention this decision.
314 U. S. 44 (1941).
'Before the Kepner case the leading case was Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v.
Schendel, 292 Fed. 326 (C. C. A. 8th 1923) which held the state court could not
interfere with rights created by federal law by means of an injunction based on
the public policy expressed in a statute preventing soliciting injury claims arising
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but rather the rationale used to reach it. In the majority opinion Mr.
justice Reed says, "A-privilege of venue, granted by the legislative body
which created this right of action, cannot be frustrated for reasons of
convenience or expense. If it is deemed unjust, the remedy is legislative ....-8 This language forecast the conclusion that special venue
statutes create an absolute right given by Congress which is not subject
to interference, either by injunction or in any other manner except by
legislation. The cases following the Kepner case arrived at this inevitable conclusion.
Before this conclusion was reached, however, there was one situation
in which the railroads might obtain an injunction. Although §6 of the
FELA provides that the state courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction
with the federal courts, the state courts found nothing in the FELA, as
did the federal courts, to prevent their exercising the power of injunction. They therefore enjoined their citizen-employees from prosecuting the foreign suit if they found it oppressive, harassing, or an
undue hardship on the railroad.0 With the advent of Miles v.Illinois
C. R. R. in 1942 the Supreme Court decided that the FELA provisions
superseded this equitable power of the state courts. Since the right to
outside the state. The court expressly put its decision on the ground of public
policy as the basis for the injunction and impliedly, left open whether or not the
state court could enjoin on the grounds of undue hardship or oppression. However, later cases held that state courts could not exercise their equitable power to
enjoin for oppression or hardship and based their decision on this case. Southern
Ry. v. Painter, 117 F. 2d 100 (C. C. A. 8th 1941), rev'd ots other grounds, 314
U. S. 155 (1941); Rader v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 108 F. 2d 980 (C. C. A.
7th 1940) ; McConnell v. Thomson, 213 Ind. 16, 8 N. E. 2d 986, 11 N. E. 2d 183
(1937). Compare Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Inlow, 64 Ohio App. 134, 28 N. E.
2d 373 (1940).
8314 U. S.44, 54 (1941).
'Alspaugh v.New York C.& St. L. R. R., 98 Ind. App. 280, 188 N. E. 869
(1934); Kern v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. R., 204 Ind. 595, 185 N. E. 446
(1933); Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. R. v. Shelly, 96 Ind. App. 273, 170 N. E.
328 (1930) ; Reed's Admx. v. Illinois C. R. R., 182 Ky. 455, 206 S.W. 794 (1918) ;
State ex rel. New York, C. & St. L. R. R. v. Nortoni, 331 Mo. 764, 55 S.W. 2d
272 (1932); Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. McGinley, 175 Wis. 565, 185 N. W. 218
(1921) ; accord, Mobile & Ohio R. R. v. Parrent, 260 Ill.
App. 284 (1931) ; Lancaster v. Dunn, 153 La. 15, 95 So. 385 (1922) ; Chicago, M., St. P. & P. Ry. v.
Wolf, 199 Wis. 278, 226 N. W. 297 (1929). The last three cases recognized the
right to enjoin but denied on the merits. Compare Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. R.
v. Ball, 126 Kan. 745, 271 Pac. 313 (1928); Southern Pacific Co. v. Baum, 39
N. M. 22, 38 P. 2d 1106 (1934) (would not enjoin on the ground of burden of
interstate commerce, and denied injunction because not sufficient hardship for interference of equity) ; Payne v. Knapp, 197 Iowa 737, 198 N. W. 62 (1924) note
inconsistency in discussing venue as a federal right under FELA in connection
with state statute, but does not recognize such right as superior to the equitable
power of injunction).
Such an injunction might also enjoin the employee's witnesses from testifying,
the notary from taking their depositions, or any other person from furthering the
suit. New York, C. & St. L. R. R. v. Perdiue, 97 Ind. App. 517, 187 N. E. 349
(1933); accord, Ex parte Crandall, 53 F. 2d 969 (C. C. A. 7th 1931) (federal
court denied habeas corpus where petitioner cited for contempt for disobeying
such an injunction).
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sue under the FELA springs from federal law, the right to sue in the
state courts is of the same quality as such right in the federal courts
and "is no more subject to interference by state action than was the
federal venue in the Kepner case."' 0 Hence a state court may not now
enjoin proceedings in another state court under FELA on the ground
of inconvenience and expense, and the language is broad enough to
include the ground of burden on interstate commerce."
Related to the injunction cases have been those involving the duty
of courts to take jurisdiction; that is, whether or not they may apply the
doctrine of forum non conveniens either on the ground of inconvenience or undue burden on interstate commerce. That the federal courts
12
cannot refuse to take jurisdiction on either ground is well-settled.
In the Second Employers' Liability Cases13 it was held that a state
court may not refuse to entertain jurisdiction of a FEL'A suit on the
ground that the Act is against public policy. From the Court's language' 4 it seemed that the state had no discretion to refuse to hear
such a suit and many cases so held.' 5 But in Douglas v. New York,
N. Y. & H. R. R.,16 seventeen years later, the Supreme Court decided
that since New York had a statute restricting actions arising out of
the state betveen non-residents, the New York court had discretion in
refusing to entertain a suit under FELA. Congress did not require
the state courts to take jurisdiction but only empowered them to do so,
and there is nothing in the Act that purports to force a duty upon such
courts as against an otherwise "valid excuse." This case is often cited
as holding that a state court may apply forum non conveniens in a
FELA suit, but in other cases where the courts have refused to take
jurisdiction similar statutes of the states regulating venue have been
involved.' 7 On the other hand, in cases not involving a state statute,
-0315 U. S.698, 704 (1942).
"1 Id. at 701, 702 and 705; id. at 707 (concurring opinion). See note 22 infra.
Wood v. Delaware & H. R.

R., 63 F. 2d 235 (C. C. A. 2d 1933) ; Southern
Ry. v. Cochran, 56 F. 2d 1019 (C. C. A. 6th 1932); Schendel v. McGee, 300 Fed.
273 (C. C. A. 8th 1924); Norris v. Illinois C. R. R., 18 F. 2d 584 (D. Minn.
1925) ; Trapp v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 283 Fed. 655 (N. D. Ohio 1922) ; Connelly v. Central R. R., 238 Fed. 932 (S. D. N. Y. 1916) ; see Schilling v. Delaware
& H. R. R., 114 F. 2d 69, 72 (C. C. A. 2d 1940). For a critical discussion of
these decisions see Note, 3 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 251 (1942).
13223 U. S. 1 (1912).
1 Id. at 58 ("The existenca of the jurisdiction creates an implication of duty
to exercise it, and that its exercise may be onerous does not militate against

that implication.").
"0Taylor v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 292 Ill. App. 457, 11 N. E. 2d 610
(1937); Holmberg v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry., 188 Mich. 605, 155 N. W. 504
(1915); Witort v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 178 Minn. 261, 226 N. W. 934 (1929);
State ex rel. Schendel v. District Court of Lyon County, 156 Minn. 380, 194 N. W.
780 (1923).
10279 U. S. 377 (1929).
11Taylor v. Southern Ry., 350 Ill. 139, 182 N. E. 805 (1932); Walton v.
Pryor, 276 Ill. 563, 115 N. E. 2d (1917); Murnan v. Wabash Ry., 246 N. Y. 244,
158 N. E. 508 (1927) ; Loftus v. Pennsylvania R. R., 107 Ohio St. 352, 140 N. E.
94 (1923).
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the courts have found a duty to exercise jurisdiction in spite of a claim
of burden on interstate commerce or inconvenience. 18 These courts cite
the Douglas case but distinguish it on the ground that they have no
statute giving them discretion to refuse jurisdiction as did the New
York court.
While a statute regulating venue is a "valid excuse" for refusing
jurisdiction, a state court has apparently never found forum non conveniens or a claim of burden on interstate commerce'" a "valid excuse."
Furthermore, the Miles case has been held to embrace the proposition
that a state court cannot apply the doctrine 20 (unless statutory-the
Miles decision did not overrule the Douglas case). In spite of Mr.
Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in the Miles case, 21 the courts have
felt that the same reasoning used in the injunction cases applies in
cases involving a refusal to take jurisdiction. If the venue right is
absolute, it is no more subject to interference by the latter than by the
former. With this same idea of an absolute right in mind, later cases
construed the Miles and Kepner cases as prohibiting interference on the
ground of burdening interstate commerce, 22 as well as on the ground of
18

Beem v. Illinois C. R. R., 55 F. 2d 708 (D. Minn. 1930) ; fIoch v. Byram,

180 Minn. 298, 230 N. W. 823 (1930) ; Boright v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R., 180

Minn. 52, 230 N. W. 457 (1930); Winders v. Illinois C. R. R., 177 Minn. 1, 223
N. W. 291, 226 N. W. 213 (1929); Bright v. Wheelock, 323 Mo. 840, 20 S. W.
2d 684
(1929).
19
Cf.McKnett v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry., 292 U. S. 230 (1934). But cf. Michigan C. R. R. v. Mix, 278 U. S. 492 (1929) (see note 22 infra).
2
Butts v. Southern Pac. Co., 69 F. Supp. 895 (S. D. N. Y. 1947) ; Sacco v.
Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 56 F. Supp. 959 (E. D. N. Y. 1944); see United States
v. National City Lines, 68 Sup. Ct. 1169, 1181 (1948) (". . . whenever Congress
has vested courts with jurisdiction to hear and determine causes and has invested
complaining litigants with a right of choice among them which is inconsistent
with the exercise by those courts of discretionary power to defeat the choice so
made, the doctrine [forum non conveniens] can have no effect," citing Kepner and
Miles cases); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501, 504 (1947) ("It is true
that in cases under the FELA we have held plaintiff's choice of forum cannot be
defeated on the basis of forum non conveniens. But this was because the special
venue act under which those cases are brought was believed to require it." For
a discussion of forum non conveniens and other types of special venue statutes,
see Note, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 34 VA. L. 1Ev. 819) ; Porter
v. Fleming, 74 F. Supp. 378, 379 (D. Minn. 1947).
And the same result has been reached in the state courts. Leet v. Union Pac.
R. R., 25 Cal. 2d 605, 155 P. 2d 42 (1944), cert. denied, 325 U. S. 866 (1945)
("The doctrine of forum non conveniens, claim of burden on interstate commerce
or war conditions constitute no justification for a refusal to exercise jurisdiction. . . . While some of the foregoing authorities involved an injunction . . .
as distinguished from a motion in the forum to refuse jurisdiction, the principle
is the same."). Compare this language with the concurring opinion in the Miles
case in note 21 infra.
21315 U. S. 698, 708 (1942) (Mr. Justice Jackson would limit the decision to
injunctions only. He agrees that one state court may not close the doors of the
courts of another state to a plaintiff with a federal cause of action, but he is not
willing to admit that the courts of the states can be told by Congress that they
must entertain jurisdiction of these suits).
" Butts v. Southern Pac. Co., 69 F. Supp. 895 (S. D. N. Y. 1947); Union
Pacific R. R. v. Utterback, 173 Ore. 572, 146 P. 2d 76 (1944); Leet v. Union
Pac. R. R., 25 Cal. 2d 605, 155 P. 2d 42 (1944), cert. denied, 325 U. S. 866 (1945)
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inconvenience. With the cases following these two, the forecast of the
Kepner case became a reality; the railroads were deprived of every
judicial means attempted thus far to limit this right. Assuming that the
instant case (which was the first circuit court of appeals decision on
the matter) was indicative of the future attitude of the courts as to
venue, contracts, then the picture was complete. The only remedy lay
with Congress.
The Jennings Bil123 sought to amend the FELA venue section and
practically eliminate the provision authorizing suits where the railroad
is doing business. This bill passed the House in the 80th Congress, but
at the close of the second session was still in the Senate Judiciary Committee; Whether or not the pressure for such an amendment will cease
remains to be determined by the effect on the problem of the new Title
28 of the United States Code. In the revision of the Code which was
effective September 1, 1948, Congress incorporated a provision giving
express statutory power to the federal courts to apply the doctrine of
forum ion conveniens.2 4 Apparently it was the intent of Congress that
this provision, should apply to FELA suits, as the revisory committee
expressly stated that the purpose of the statute is to relieve the situation
under the decision of the Kepner case.
The Supreme Court has held
that the test of whether or not an absolute right in the venue exists
is "not to be answered by such indecisive inquiries as whether the venue
or jurisdictional statute is labelled a 'special' or 'general' one. . . . It
is rather to be decided, upon consideration of all the relevant materials,
by whether the legislative purpose and the effect of the language used
(cites Miles case that Congress has exercised its authority over interstate commerce and permits such suits despite the incidental burden on a defendant, where
process may be obtained on a defendant not merely soliciting business but actually
carrying on railroading by operating trains and maintaining traffic offices within
the territory of the court's jurisdiction). Butts v. Southern Pac. Co., supra at
896 distinguishes Davis v. Farmers Co-operative Equity Co., 262 U. S. 312 (1923)
on the ground that a state may not burden interstate commerce, but Congress may.
In note 11 at page 51 of the Kepner case, it is stated: "Michigan Central v. Mix
...turn[s? on the absence of inconsequential character of business done within
the states where the railroads were sued." It seems that the Mix case is not
authority that the courts may refrain from exercising jurisdiction on the ground
of burden on interstate commerce where the forum is otherwise proper, but rather
that there was not sufficient business done in the state to constitute proper venue
within §6, and to so find on the facts would be a burdening of interstate commerce by the state court. Cf. Hoffman v. Missouri ex rel. Foraker, 274 U. S. 21
(1927) (where Court on the facts finds sufficient doing of business to take jurisdiction under FELA).
2sH. R. 1639. This bill provided the plaintiff could sue only where the cause
of action arose or where plaintiff resided at the time of injury, unless could not
serve defendant with process issuing out of any of the courts mentioned, in which
case could sue where the defendant does business. For a criticism of the provisions of the bill see 34 A. B. A. J. 454 (1948).
2428 U. S. C. C. S. §1404(a) (1948) ("For the convenience of parties and
witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action
to any other district or division where it might have been brought.").
"2See Reviser's Notes to §1404(a) in 28 U. S. C. C. S. at p. 1853.
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to achieve it were to vest the power of choice in the plaintiff or to
confer power upon the courts to qualify his selection. ' 20 In the past,
courts have considered this particular venue statute as conferring a
special right because of its legislative history. Now Congress has manifested an intent to confer power upon the courts to qualify the selection
of forum. Therefore, applying the test laid down by the Supreme
Court, it is submitted that this is no longer an absolute right. Without
this idea of an absolute right, the obstacle to using injunctions in the
federal courts no longer exists; interference by injunction should be
allowed if it is allowed by applying forum non conveniens. The rule
that a federal court may not enjoin the proceeding in a state court will,
of course, remain unchanged.2 T As for the state courts, the Miles case
pointed out that the right to sue in state courts under the Act is of the
same quality as such right in the federal courts. It would seem to
follow that if venue is subject to interference in the federal courts,
it may also be interfered with in the state courts. The state courts
would again say that nothing in the FELA prevents their applying
forum non conveniens or granting injunctions.
It is hoped that the courts will not hold the new provision of the
Judicial Code applicable only in cases arising under the general venue
provisions of the federal courts.27 If, instead, the courts do carry out
the apparent intent of Congress and apply the doctrine of forum nwn
conveniens in suits brought under the FELA, they would provide a
solution fair to both employee and railroad in that the injured employee
would still have a wide choice of forums but where this right was
abused the courts could protect the defendant by refusing to exercise
jurisdiction.
KATHERINE S.

WRIGHT.

Criminal Procedure-Method of Raising Constitutional IssuesWrit of Coram Nobis
The federal courts have become increasingly zealous of protecting
the rights of those whose convictions have been obtained without due
". United States v. National City Lines, 68 Sup. Ct. 1169, 1182 (1948).
2' Section 2283 of the revised Judicial Code incorporates some general exceptions which the old §265 did not have. One of these exceptions wyas put in to
overrule Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U. S. 118 (1941), which decision was followed by Southern Ry. v. Painter,314 U. S. 155 (1941) (see note
5 supra). The exception will not apply in the Painter case, however, because in
that case there was no federal decree to protect as in the Toucey case. See Southern Ry. v. Painter, supra at 160 (concurring opinion) ; Reviser's Notes to §2283,
28 U. S. C. C. S. at page 1910.
-" Since the preparation of this note three federal district courts have decided
that §1404(a) of the revised Judicial Code applies to suits under the FELA.
Hayes v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R., 79 F. Supp. 821 (D. Minn. 1948); White v.
Thompson, 80 F. Supp. 411 (N. D. Ill. 1948); Nunn v. Chicago, M., St. P. &
P. R. R., 80 F. Supp. 745 (S. D. N. Y. 1948).
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1
process of law. Whereas, at one time, it was necessary for a petitioner
seeking relief from a state conviction by means of a writ of habeas
corpus in federal district courts to show that he had exhausted all his
available state remedies, 2 it now appears that a petitioner who has exhausted but one of several available state remedies, may petition the
federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus. 3 Under this line of
decisions, however, in default of any state procedure by which the
question of due process can be raised, the federal courts will take jurisdiction. 4 In state procedure such questions can of course be raised by
motion for a new trial made in apt time,5 but if this remedy has been
allowed to lapse without fault of the petitioner, he may find himself
denied due process. In North Carolina no statutory procedure has been
outlined and there is nothing more than a judicial intimation of the
procedure whereby he may raise these questions and have the merits
of his constitutional claim passed upon by the highest state court.
In a recent North Carolina case, 6 petitioner had been indicted on
several capital charges involving first degree burglary. He tendered
pleas of guilty of second degree burglary which were accepted and he
was thereupon sentenced. The statutory period for appeal lapsed and
the term of superior court in which he had been convicted expired,
without an appeal having been perfected or a motion for a new trial
made. A year and a half later petitioner applied to a judge of the
superior court for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that at his trial he
had been denied due process of law in that he had been unable to
employ counsel and had been denied benefit of counsel when he was
required to plead to the capital charges. Upon a hearing the application
was dismissed. Petitioner then applied to the supreme court for a
I Wade v. Mayo, 68 Sup. Ct. 1270 (1947) ; Loftus v. Illinois, 68 Sup. Ct. 1212
(1947) ; Hedgebeth v. North Carolina, 68 Sup. Ct. 1185 (1947) ; Foster v. Illinois,
332 U. S. 134 (1946); De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U. S. 663 (1946); Hawk
v. Olsen, 326 U. S. 271 (1945) ; White v. Ragen, 324 U. S. 760 (1944) ; House
v. Mayo, 324 U. S. 42 (1944); Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 U. S. 485 (1944);
Ex parte Hawk, 321 U. S. 114 (1943); Ex parte Davis, 318 U. S. 412 (1943);
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103 (1935); Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U. S. 179
(1907) ; Note, 26 N. C. L. REv. 217 (1948).
2 White v. Ragen, 324 U. S. 760 (1944) ; House v. Mayo, 324 U. S. 42 (1944) ;
Ex parte Hawk, 321 U. S. 114 (1943); Ex parte Davis, 318 U. S. 412 (1943);
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103 (1935).
'Wade v. Mayo, 68 Sup. Ct. 1270 (1947).
'Hedgebeth v. North Carolina, 68 Sup. Ct. 1185 (1947); Foster v. Illinois,
332 U. S. 134 (1946); Hawk v. Olsen, 326 U. S. 271 (1945); see Mooney v.
Holohan, 294 U. S. 103, 115 (1935).
IN. C. GEN. STAT. §§15-174, 1-207, 7-11 (1943) ; State v. Dunheen, 224 N. C.
738, 32 S. E. 2d 322 (1944); State v. Edwards, 205 N. C. 661, 172 S. E. 399
(1933) ; State v. Lea, 203 N. C. 316, 166 S. E. 292 (1932), cert. denied, 287 U. S.
668 (1932) ; State v. Cox, 202 N. C. 378, 162 S. E. 907 (1932) ; State v. Casey,
201 N. C. 620, 161 S. E. 81 (1931) (motion may be made at trial term only if
no appeal; if appeal, motion can be made the next succeeding term following
affirmance of judgment on appeal).
'In re Taylor, 229 N. C. 297, 49 S. E. 2d 749 (1948).
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writ of certiorari to review the judgment in the habeas corpus proceeding. Held: The writ of habeas corpus is not a proper remedy to
raise the constitutional question the petitioner seeks to present for review.
Certiorari was denied. The court, however, intimated that an appropriate procedure would have been to petition the supreme court for
permission to file in the superior court a petition for a writ of error
coram nobis.
The writ of error coram iwbis, or corarn vobis,7 is of ancient common law origin. The writ was devised to allow a court which rendered
a judgment to review it for an error of fact, existing at the time of the
judgment, but unknown to the court; which fact, if it had been known,
would have led to a different result.8 The writ did not lie for an error
of law,9 but was limited exclusively to errors of fact, and has been
used to set aside a previous judgment when plaintiff or defendant was a
married woman ;1o an infant had appeared by attorney instead of by next
friend or guardian ad litem; a party was insane at time of trial ;12 a
party died before judgment ;13 there was error in the service of process
or notice to the other party ;1_4 or clerical mistakes were made in entering the judgment. 5
Such a writ has been used as a part of North Carolina procedure1 0
and has been regulated by statute,17 but the use of the writ in civil cases
seems to have been replaced by statutory remedies, either by motion for
a new trial or other appropriate motions.' s

12 TIDD, PACTICE OF THE COURTS OF KINGS BENCH 1136 (3d Am. ed. 1840);
III BL. Comm. 1158 (4th ed., Cooley, 1899); see Massie v. Hainey, 165 N. C.
174, 177, 81 S. E. 135, 136 (1914) ; Roberts v. Pratt, 152 N. C. 731, 736, 68 S. E.
240, 242 (1910).

,See Roughton v. Brown, 53 N. C. 393, 394 (1861); cases collected in 49

C. J. S., JUDGMENTS §312(c).

'2 TIDD, op. cit. supra note 7, at 1136.
10 Roughton v. Brown, 53 N. C. 393 (1861) ; see Lassiter v. Harper, 32 N. C.
392, 394 (1849) ; 1 STEPHEN, PLEADING 119 (3d Am. ed. 1837) ; 2 TroD, op. cit.
supra note 7, at 1136.
" 1 STEPHEN, op. cit. spra note 10, at 119; 2 TIDD, op. Cit. supra note 7, at
1136;2 see cases collected, 49 C. J. S., JUDGMENTS, p. 566 n. 86.
"3See note, 121 A. L. R. 267 (1939).
" See Tyler v. Morris, 20 N. C. 625 (1839) ; 1 TIDD, op. Cit. supra note 7, at
1136;
cases collected, 49 C. J. S., JUDGMENTS, p. 567 n. 91.
14See
Massie v. Hainey, 165 N. C. 174, 178, 81 S. E. 135, 136 (1914) ; cases
collected, 49 C. 3. S., JTUDGMENTS, p. 566 n. 76.
" Haiwassee Lumber Co. v. United States, 64 F. 2d 417 (C. C. A. 4th 1933);
see Note, 126 A. L. R. 956 (1940).
10

Roughton v. Brown, 53 N. C. 393 (1861) ; Latham v. Hodges, 35 N. C. 267

(1852) ; Williams v. Edwards, 34 N. C. 118 (1851) ; Lassiter v. Harper, 32 N. C.
392 (1849); Tyler v. Morris, 20 N. C. 625 (1839); see Massie v. Hainey, 165
N. C. 174, 81 S. E. 135 (1914).
1' N. C. REV. STAT., c. 4, §20 (1836-37).
But see Roberts v. Pratt, 152 N. C.
731, 68 S.E. 240 (1910).

1 Simms v. Sampson, 221 N. C. 379, 20 S. E. 2d 554 (1942); Welch v. Welch,
194 N. C. 633, 140 S. E. 436 (1927) (infant improperly represented) ; Cox v.
Cox, 221 N. C. 19, 18 S. E. 2d 713 (1942); Hood v. Holding, 205 N. C. 451, 171
S. E. 633 (1933) (party insane at time of trial) ; Taylor v. Caudle, 208 N. C.
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Under the civil procedure of North Carolina, a superior court retains jurisdiction of a judgment for a limited time after the close of
the term, 19 but may entertain a motion in the original cause to set aside
a judgment for irregularity at any time.2 0 Therefore, since statutory
remedies are available for the same relief which could be obtained at
common law only by writ of error corarn nobis, these remedies seem to
21
have superseded the writ in practice.
In criminal actions, unlike civil, a superior court does not retain
jurisdiction to set aside a judgment on motion after the term has expired 22 unless there has been an appeal.2 After the term expires at
which judgment was rendered in a criminal proceeding, and no appeal
is taken, the jurisdiction of the superior court ends insofar as the terms
of the judgment are concerned. 24 Therefore, the superior court is without jurisdiction to entertain any motion by defendant based on a denial
of a constitutional right at such trial.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina by the constitution 25 and
statutory provision pursuant thereto, 26 is given general supervisory
jurisdiction, and under this power it can grant any remedial writs necessary to insure the proper administration of justice in the lower courts.
As has been pointed out, the writ of error coram nobis has been a part
of North Carolina procedure and will remain so unless specifically abrogated by statute.2 7 And while it seems no longer to be used in civil
298, 180 S. E. 699 (1935) ; Wood v. Watson, 107 N. C. 52, 12 S.E. 49 (1890) ;
Knott v. Taylor, 99 N. C. 511, 6 S. E. 788 (1888) ; Lynn v. Lowe, 88 N. C. 478
(1883) (death of a party before judgment); Monroe v. Niven, 221 N. C. 362,
20 S. E. 2d 311 (1942) ; Groce v. Groce, 214 N. C. 398, 199 S. E. 388 (1938) ;
Fowler v. Fowler, 190 N. C. 536, 130 S. E. 315 (1925) (error in service of
process) ; Everett v. Johnson, 219 N. C. 540, 14 S. E. 2d 520 (1941) ; Massie v.
Hainey, 165 N. C. 174, 81 S. E. 348 (1914) (inadequate notice to other party) ;
N. C. Joint Stock Bank v. Cherry, 227 N. C. 105, 40 S. E. 2d 799 (1946) ; Ragen
v. Ragen, 202 N. C. 753, 194 S. E. 458 (1937) (clerical mistakes in entering
judgment) ; see generally Roberts v. Pratt, 152 N. C. 731, 736, 68 S.E. 240, 242
(1910); McINrosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTIcE AND PROcEDURE §656 (1929).
'9 N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-220 (1943) (jurisdiction to set aside for mistake, surprise, excusable neglect within one year) ; Federal Land Bank v. Davis, 215 N. C.
100, 1 S.E. 2d 350 (1939) ; Abernethy Finance Co. v. First Security Trust Co.,
213 N. C. 369, 196 S. E. 340 (1938) (judgment pending until satisfied, open to
motion for execution, recall of execution, determination of proper credits); McINTOSH, op. cit. supra note 18, §§649 et seq.
"oFederal Land Bank v. Davis, 215 N. C. 100, 1 S. E. 2d 350 (1939); Hood
v. Stewart, 209 N. C. 424, 184 S. E. 36 (1936) ; MCINToSH, op. cit. supra note 18,
§653.
21 See note 18 supra.
-2State v. Edwards, 205 N. C. 661, 172 S.E. 399 (1933) ; State v. Casey, 201
N. C. 620, 161 S.E. 81 "(1931) ; Lancaster v. Bland, 168 N. C. 377, 84 S.E. 529

(1915).

" State v. Edwards, 205 N. C. 661, 172 S.E. 399 (1933); State v. Lea, 203
N. C. 316, 166 S. E. 292 (1932); State v. Cox, 202 N. C. 378, 162 S. E. 907
(1932) ; State v. Casey, 201 N. C. 620, 161 S.E. 81 (1931).
4 Cases cited note 5 supra.
2 N. C. CoNsT. Art. IV, §8.
2' N. C. GEN. STAT. §7-10 (1943).
' N. C. GEN. STAT. §4-1 (1943).
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actions, there is no reason why it should not be used in criminal actions
where there is no other adequate remedy.28 From the nature and purpose of the writ it could not be used by the supreme court, because the
writ does not lie from a higher to a lower court,20 but the supreme
court under its supervisory powers could direct and empower the superior
court to assume jurisdiction of the prior cause and to hear the petition
for the writ. Such action on the part of the supreme court would be
discretionary. Even so, if the court in its discretion declined to exercise its power to direct the superior court to hear the petition for the
writ on the grounds that the application did not show substantial merit,
the applicant would have had his constitutional claim passed upon by
the highest state court.80 On the other hand, if the supreme court should
grant the application, the superior court would then be empowered to
hear the petition for the writ of error corain nobis, and to pass upon the
constitutional questions presented. From an adverse judgment on the
petition, an appeal would lie to the supreme court. But in view of the
opinion In re Taylor,8 1 undoubtedly this procedure must be followed
hereafter before the federal courts will entertain a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus to review questions arising in North Carolina involving
32
the denial of due process.
EMERY

B.

DENNY, JR.

Criminal Procedure-Present Insanity-Determination of the
Issue When Raised Before Trial
When the case of State v. Sullivan1 was called for trial, the attorney
for the defendant (charged with breaking and entering with intent to
commit a felony) desired to enter the plea of incapacity to plead to the
bill of indictment and submitted the issue of defendant's mental capacity
as the only issue at that time. The court announced, however, that both
that issue and the issue of guilt or innocence would be submitted to the
jury at the same time. Defendant, through his counsel, objected to this
ruling, excepted, and appealed. The Supreme Court held that the submission to the same jury of both issues at the same time was a matter
28
N. C. GEN. STAT. §4-1 (1943); cf. Jones v. Commonwealth, 269 Ky. 779,
108 S. W. 2d 816 (1937) (overruled on another point, Smith v. Buchanan, 291
Ky. 44, 163 S. W. 2d 5 [1942], modified on other points, Day v. Commonwealth,
296 Ky. 483, 177 S. W. 2d 391 [1944]) ; Carlsen v. State, 129 Neb. 84, 261 N. W.
339 (1935).
29 Roughton v. Brown, 53 N. C. 393 (1861).
20 Taylor v. Alabama, 68 Sup. Ct. 1415 (1947) ; Hysler v. Florida, 315 U. S.
411 (1941).
"'229 N. C. 297, 49 S. E. 2d 749 (1948).
22 Taylor v. Alabama, 68 Sup. Ct. 1415 (1947) ; Hedgebeth v. North Carolina,
68 Sup. Ct. 1185 (1947); Foster v. Illinois, 332 U. S. 134 (1946); Hysler v.
Florida, 315 U. S. 411 (1941).
-229 N. C. 251, 49 S. E. 2d 458 (1948).
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within the discretion of the trial court, and, such discretion not being
abused here, error was not made to appear in the trial below.
In arriving at its decision, the court at once admitted that our only
statutes on this question2 do not prescribe the method by which the
court shall determine the question of the ability of the defendant to
plead to the indictment or make his defense.3 Hence the matter of procedure would be governed by the common law.4 The court then held
the common law rule to be that the trial judge may, in his discretion,
inquire into the facts himself, empanel a special jury for the purpose,
or submit the issue of present insanity as an issue to the trial jury.5
In our modern world, the whole tempo of life has been accelerated.
As a result, and because of improved psychiatric methods for detection
of mental disorders, that incidents of mental disorder are being increasingly recognized is common knowledge. Therefore it is important that
questions concerning incapacity to plead because of mental disorder or
insanity 6 be handled correctly by the courts.
A re-examination of the question of how the issue of present insanity
raised by a plea before tria 7 ought to be determined could and should
bring about a solution different from that of the principal case. It is
submitted that the better interpretation of the common law rule is that
when the issue of present insanity is raised before trial and is to be
determined, the trial shall not proceed until such issue has been inquired
into, with or without a jury, and if the defendant be found to be mentally incompetent, the court should postpone the criminal proceedings
until he has recovered his sanity.8 Properly interpreted, it would seem
2N. C. GEN. STAT. §§122-83, 84 (1943).
-229 N. C. 251, 254, 49 S. E. 2d 458, 460 (1948) ("But the General Assembly
has prescribed no procedure . .. for the investigation by the court preliminarily
to adjudicating the question as to whether accused is so mentally disordered as
to be incapable of making a rational defense... !').
'N. C. GEN. STAT. §4-1 (1943) ; Hoke v. Greyhound Corp., 226 N. C. 332, 38

S. E. 2d 105 (1946).

'The court discussed six North Carolina cases bearing on the question of
present insanity and held that the end result of them is to sustain the right of the

trial court to submit the double issue to the trial jury: State v. Godwin, 216 N. C.
49, 3 S. E. 2d 347 (1938) ; State v. Sandlin, 156 N. C. 624, 72 S. E. 203 (1911) ;
State v. Khoury, 149 N. C. 454, 62 S. E. 638 (1908) ; State v. Haywood, 94 N. C.
847 (1886) ; State v. Vann, 84 N. C. 722 (1880) ; State v. Harris, 53 N. C. 136
(1860).
'N. C. Laws 1945, c. 952 §§53, 54 amend N. C. GEN. STAT. §§122-83, 84
(1943) to strike out the word "insane" where it appears and replaces it with the
words "mentally disordered," and likewise replaces "insanity" with "mental

disorder."
"The plea of present insanity may be raised before trial, at any time during
trial, or after conviction but before sentencing. This discussion is limited to the
determination of the issue when raised before trial. For a general discussion of

the subject, see Note, 142 A. L. R. 961 (1943); Parker, The Determination of
Insanity in Criminal Caes, 26 CoRx. L. R"v. 375 (1941); WEIHoFEIr, INSANITY
AS A DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL LAW 333-395 (1933).
'4 BL. CoMM. *25 ("Also, if a man in his sound memory commits a capital
offence, and before arraignment for it, he becomes mad, he ought not to be
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that under this rule the halting of the criminal proceeding is imperative,
and the discretionary matter involved is in the method used for the
determination of the issue of present mental capacity while the criminal
proceeding is suspended.9
Furthermore, an examination of the North Carolina cases discussed
in the principal case discloses that none of them dealt with the exact
situation presented by that case.' 0 Also, it is encouraging to note that
the decision in the principal case was not unanimous."
Perhaps the most forward-thinking and enlightened procedure developed for the handling of the issue under discussion has been devised
in Massachusetts by its "Briggs Law'' x which provides in substance
for the routine psychiatric examination by the Department of Mental
Diseases of all persons falling within certain legal categories.' 3 This
arraigned for it; because he is not able to plead to it with that advice and cau-

tion that he ought. And if, after he has pleaded, the prisoner becomes mad, he
shall not be tried; for how can he make his defence? ... for peradventure, says
the humanity of the English law, had the prisoner been of sound memory he
might have alleged something in stay of judgment or execution.") ; 3 Co. INsT.
*4; 1 HALF, P. C. 34 (New ed. 1778) ; WEiHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 7, at 333.
'United States v. Harriman, 4 F. Supp. 186 (S. D. N. Y. 1933) ("That there
should be an inquiry is clear beyond controversy. Not alone is this dictated by
humane instincts, but as a matter of law it is the duty of the court to make it in
some form. Indeed, it would be reversible error on the part of the court not to
carry on such an investigation in advance of entering on a trial or placing the
defendant on trial. What shall be the procedure is the problem. . . . The form
of the procedure is within the discretion of the court.") ; WEIHOFEN, Op. cit. supra
note 7, at 334; Jordan v. State, 124 Tenn. 81, 135 S. W. 327 (1911) (summarizes
reasons usually given why mental disorder is held to necessitate the stopping of
the criminal proceedings: "It would be inhumane, and to a certain extent a denial
of the right of trial upon the merits, to require one who has been disabled by the
act of God from intelligently making his defense to plead or be tried for his life
or liberty. There may be circumstances in all cases of which the defendant alone
has knowledge, which would prove his innocence, the advantage of which, if insane
to such an extent that he did not appreciate the value of such facts, or the propriety
of communicating them to counsel, he would be deprived.").
"0State v. Godwin, 216 N. C. 49, 3 S. E. 2d 347 (1938) (suggestion of present
insanity made after conviction and before judgment) ; State v. Vann, 84 N. C. 722
(1880) (suggestion of present insanity made after conviction and before judgment); State v. Sandlin, 156 N. C. 624, 72 S. E. 203 (1911) (plea of present
insanity not raised before trial) ; State v. Khoury, 149 N. C. 454, 62 S. E. 638
(1908) (issue was the right of defendant to withdraw plea of not guilty and enter
plea of insanity) ; State v. Haywood, 94 N. C. 847 (1886) (language on propriety of issues of insanity and guilt or innocence being submitted at same time to
same jury was dicta, error being found in other respects; but even in the dicta
the court said that the issues ought to be separated) ; State v. Harris, 53 N. C.
136 (1860) (deaf mute).
' Barnhill, J., dissented without opinion. The writer is very strongly of the
opinion that the reason for the dissent was because it was felt that the issue of
present insanity should be tried first since that was the common law rule and
North Carolina has no statutes changing the common law and the cases cited in
the opinion are not precedents because not directly in point.
12

MAss. GEN. LAws c. 123, §100A (1932), called the "Briggs Law" after Dr.

L. Vernon Briggs of Boston, a psychiatrist of note, who secured the enactment
of the legislation.
" Routine mental examination is made whenever a person is indicted by a
grand jury for a capital offense, or whenever a person, who is known to have
been indicted for any other offense more than once or to have been previously
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If such a system were adopted
procedure has been highly praised.'
in North Carolina, the "battle of the experts" would be abolished ;15 the
problem of hearing and deciding psychiatric questions would be put in
the hands of persons capable of understanding the intricacies of that
science and its vernacular ;16 much time and expense in court would be
saved for the accused and the prosecutor; certain classes of offenders
would be examined as a matter of course; the examination would be
made before trial; the examination would eliminate the special trial before judge and jury and the subjection of the accused to the morbid
public eye in open court; it would eliminate to some extent the possibility of offenders still suffering from a mental defect being released
into society; and it would provide for the early discovery of latent
abnormality and for the partial determent of many who otherwise would
7
continue in a life of crime.
Under the present state of case law in North Carolina, it is to be
hoped that a re-examination of the issue here discussed will bring about
a determination by the court in line with the proper interpretation of
the common law as outlined above. With or without this, attention
should be given to the possibility of enacting into our statutes a law
along the lines of the "Briggs Law" of Massachusetts whereby the question of insanity or mental disorder may be settled in all criminal cases1 8
in a routine and scientific manner.
JOHN M. SIMMs.
1949]

convicted of a felony, is indicted by the grand jury or bound over for trial in the
superior court. The examination is made without reference to any plea of insanity, contemplated or actual. WEIHOFEN, op. cit. s-upra note 7, at 405 (a "weakness of the act is that it applies only to certain types of offenders ... ").
Id. at 401. ("The Massachu14 WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 7, at 401-404.
setts 'Briggs Law' is almost the only practicable recommendation looking to the
sensible objective of sorting out the insane and irresponsible offenders before
going through the time-and-money-wasting process of a criminal trial."); Overholser, The Massachusetts Procedure Relative to the Sanity of Defendants in
Criminal Cases, 19 MINN. L. Rav. 308 (1935); Comment, 30 MARQ. L. REv. 62
(1947); S. Glueck, Psychiatric Examination of Persons Accused of Crime, 36
the most far-sighted piece of legislation yet passed
YALE L. J. 632 (1927) ("....
on this subject.") ; Parker, The Determination of Insanity in Criminal Cases, 26
CoRN. L. Q. 375, 425 (1941) (the routine examination feature of the Massachusetts law "must be commended because of its basic recognition that insane people,
whether or not they are criminals, constitute medical, rather than legal, problems
to be dealt with by hospitals and not courts.").
"5Overholser, The Mental State of Defendants in Criminal Trials-A Comparison of Some Colorado and Massachusetts Procedures, 14 Rocxrv Mr. L. Rv.
21, 27 (1942).
" Laub, Insanity as a Defense to Homicide in Pennsylvania, 20 TEmp. L. Q.
345, 352 (1947).
17 See generally references note 14 supra.
1. Comment, 30 MARQ. L. REv. 62, 68 (1947).
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Evidence-Self Incrimination-Admissibility of Compulsory
Voice Identification
In a recent South Carolina case1 the defendant was accused of committing rape. Before trial he was compelled by the sheriff to repeat
certain words which the rapist had spoken at the time of the crime. The
prosecutrix immediately identified the accused by his voice as the rapist.
Testimony as to this identification was admitted at trial, and the defendant was convicted. On appeal the court held that admission of this
testimony was error, since it violated the defendant's constitutional
guaranty 2 not to be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Historically 3 the privilege of a person not to be compelled to testify
or give evidence against himself in a criminal case developed as a
safeguard against the obtaining of testimony from the accused through
inquisition and torture in the ecclesiastical courts and the Court of
Star Chamber in England. It later became a doctrine of the common4
law courts, and is now guaranteed in the United States Constitution,
the North Carolina Constitution, 5 and the constitutions of all but two
of the remaining states.0 North Carolina7 and nearly all other states
8
also have statutes which restate the guaranty in statutory form. The
wording of the privilege varies among the states, but this does not
affect the scope or application of the privilege. 9
While there has been some criticism of the privilege,' 0 there are still
valid reasons for retaining it. It forces a more diligent search for
extrinsic evidence and provides protection against overzealous officers
and district attorneys." The privilege furnishes no protection against
testimony which is voluntarily given, 12 or testimony which is merely
degrading rather than actually incriminating.' 3 It does apply to com' State v. Taylor, 49 S. E. 2d 289 (S. C. 1948).

* S. C. CONST. Art. I, §17: "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself."
'For a comprehensive history of the privilege see 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2250
(3d ed. 1940).
'U. S. CONST. AMEND. V: "No person . . .shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself."
N. C. CONST. Art. I, §11: "In all criminal prosecutions every man has the
right to ... not be compelled to give evidence against himself."
I Iowa and New Jersey. But both of these states now provide for the privilege
by statute. IowA CODE §622.14 (1946) ; N. 3. STAT. ANN. §§2:97-6, 7 (1939).

'N. C.

GEN. STAT.

§8-54 (1943).

'8 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §2252 n. 3 (3d ed. 1940).

' Councelman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S.547 (1871) ; 8 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE §324
(3d ed. 1940) ("The detailed rules are to be determined by the historical and
logical requirements of the principle, regardless of the particular words of a
particular constitution.").
108 WIGOORE, EVIDENCE

"Ibid.
"State

§2251 (3d ed. 1940).

v. Farrell, 223 N. C. 804, 28 S. E. 2d 560 (1944); State v. Simpson,

133 N. C. 676, 45 S.E. 567 (1903).
23 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2255 (3d ed. 1940).
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pulsory production of incriminating papers,' 4 and to facts which tend
to incriminate as well as those which amount to a direct admission of
guilt.15
The question of the admissibility of compulsory voice identification
raised by the Taylor case has never been considered by the North
Carolina Supreme Court, and only two other jurisdictions besides South
Carolina have considered it. In an early Pennsylvania case 6 the court
said by way of dictum that such evidence would not violate the privilege against self-incrimination and should be admitted. In a later Texas
case 17 the court held in a direct ruling that compulsory voice identification violated the privilege and was not admissible.
In reaching its decision in the instant case the court relied on and
followed the previous South Carolina case of State v. Griffin'8 which
held that compelling an accused person to place her foot in a footprint
found at the scene of the crime was a violation of the constitutional
privilege and evidence of the comparison was not admissible. The court
said, "It is difficult to draw any distinction between compelling a defendant to put his foot in a track at the scene of the crime in order to
afford a basis for comparison and requiring a defendant to repeat certain
words used at the scene of the crime in order to establish a basis for
identity."'0 The decision assumes, without deciding, that if the accused
had merely been compelled to speak without any compulsion as to subject or words used, such testimony would have been admissible. 20 The
questions raised by this decision, therefore, are whether a person may
be compelled to give up evidence about his body and person without
violating his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, and
whether compulsory voice identification is evidence within this category.
There is great confusion in the cases. 2' The minority decisions hold
14 State v. Hollingsworth, 191 N. C. 595, 132 S. E. 667 (1926).
Smith v. Smith, 116 N. C. 386, 21 S. E. 196 (1895).
1' See Johnson v. Commonwealth, 115 Pa. 369, 395, 9Atl. 78, 81 (1887).
" Beachem v. State, 144 Tex. Crim. Rep. 272, 162 S. W. 2d 706 (1942). The
decision makes the same distinction which is suggested in the Taylor case, that
had there been no compulsion as to subject or particular words spoken, the testimony would have been admissible. The court also relied upon a Texas statute
which provided that a confession of an accused person shall not be used against
him if obtained while he is in jail or custody, unless it is in writing and after
warning.
a proper
16129 S. C. 200, 124 S. E. 81 (1924).
10 State v. Taylor, 49 S. E. 289, 292 (S. C. 1948).
.0 This distinction does not appear to be valid. If the voice identification is
admissible at all, compelling the accused to repeat the exact words which had
been heard would only make the identification more accurate. In State v. Neville,
175 N. C. 731, 95 S. E. 55 (1918), which admitted evidence that the accused was
compelled to go to the scene of the crime and stand in a position where the
criminal had been seen, the court said, "It was fairer to present him to her amid
the surroundings where the occurrence took place."
2'8 WIGMORE,

1144 (1947).

EvIDENcE §2265 n. 2 (3d ed. 1940).

See Note, 171 A. L. R.
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that the privilege should be broadly construed to cover any compulsory
actions of the accused, 22 while the majority of jurisdictions construe the
privilege more strictly and hold that physical evidence about the body
of the accused should not be within the privilege.
In the early case of State v. Jacobs,23 the North Carolina Supreme
Court held that compelling a defendant to exhibit himself to the inspection of the jury for the purpose of enabling them to determine his
status as a free Negro was a violation of the privilege. This case has
not been overruled by the court, but has been distinguished 24 and has
never been followed. The decision has been criticized by writers 25 and
in decisions of other jurisdictions. 2 Since the Jacobs case, however,
North Carolina has consistently followed the more modern view and
admitted evidence produced by compulsory physical actions of the
27
accused.
Application of the minority view, which construes the privilege as
applying to any evidence obtained by compulsion, has reached some
extreme results. It has been held that a person cannot be compelled to
stand up in court to be identified by his accuser ;28 that he cannot be
compelled to try on a coat 29 or hat3" found at the scene of the crime to
determine if it fits; and that he cannot be compelled to place his foot
in a track for comparison and identification. 3 ' Holding that this type
of compulsory evidence should not be admissible appears to be an ex" Hunt v. State, 248 Ala. 217, 224, 27 So. 2d 186, 193 (1946) ("A person in
this state cannot be required against his will to do any positive act tending to
operate as evidence against himself in a criminal case.").
23 50 N. C. 259 (1858).
2 State v. Johnson, 67 N. C. 55 (1872) (the distinction made is that in exhibiting himself to the prosecuting witness rather than the jury, it is testimony of the
witness and not the accused which is admitted) ; State v. Vincent, 222 N. C. 543,
23 S. E. 2d 832 (1943).
" STANSBURY,
NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE §57 n. 12 (1946); Inbau, Selfincrimination-What Canz an Accused Person Be Compelled to Do?, 28 J. CRILX.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 261, 272 (1938).
28 State v. Ah Chuey, 14 Nev. 79, 33 Am. Rep. 530 (1879).
2 State v. Johnson, 67 N. C. 55 (1872) (defendant required to stand up during
trial for prosecuting witness to identify him) ; State v. Graham, 74 N. C. 646
(1876) (defendant compelled to place foot in track for comparison); State v.
Thompson, 161 N. C. 238, 76 S. E. 249 (1912) (defendant required to aim gun
through a window at the scene of the crime to see if he was the proper height
to have fired the shot) ; State v. Neville, 175 N. C. 731, 95 S. E. 55 (1918)
(defendant compelled to go to the scene of the crime and stand in the position
the person committing the crime had been seen in) ; State v. Bazemore, 193 N. C.
336, 137 S. E. 172 (1927) (defendant compelled to place a hat on his head in a
particular way) ; State v. Garrett, 71 N. C. 85 (1874) (witness compelled to unwrap
her bandaged hand to show whether or not it was burned). See also 5 N. C. L.
REv. 333 (1927).
28 Smith v. State, 247 Ala. 354, 24 So. 2d 546 (1946).
29 Ward v. State, 27 Okla. Cr. R. 362, 228 Pac. 498 (1924).
20 Allen v. State, 183 Md. 603, 39 A. 2d 820 (1944).
Cooper v. State, 86 Ala. 610, 6 So. 110 (1889) : Elder v. State, 143 Ga. 363,
85 S. E. 97 (1915) ; State v. Griffin, 129 S. C. 200, 124 S. E. 81 (1924).
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82
travagant extension of the constitutional privilege, and would tend to
protect the guilty and hamper the search for the truth.
The strict interpretation followed by North Carolina and the majority of other jurisdictions appears to be the better reasoned and more
practical view. It restricts application of the privilege to testimonial
compulsion rather than any and every compulsion of the accused. The
distinction is clearly stated by Professor Wigmore, who says, "Unless
some attempt is made to secure a communication, written or oral, upon
which reliance is to be placed as involving his consciousness of the facts
and the operations of his mind in expressing it, the demand made upon
'33
him is not testimonial.
Evidence as to physical characteristics of the accused which he is
compelled to furnish for use as identification data is not considered as
making him furnish evidence against himself. It is dependent upon
physical facts and conditions, and does not depend upon confessions,
admissions, or statements of the accused. 34 Such evidence cannot be
influenced by compulsion or fear of punishment. "It is called by the
civilians 'real evidence,' is always admissible, and is of greater or less
value according to the circumstances." 3 5
Compulsory voice identification is on the borderline between compulsion of identification data about the body of the accused and testimonial compulsion.3 6 But it is submitted that proper application of the
North Carolina and majority reasoning to the instant case would result
in a ruling contrary to that handed down by the South Carolina court.
There was no testimonial compulsion of the accused. He was merely
compelled to furnish a sample of his voice for comparison and identification, and the words conveyed no communication or conscious meaning
as to the crime or the accused's possible connection with it. The only
use made of the words spoken was to compare the quality, pitch, or
accent of the voice of the accused with the voice the prosecutrix had
heard at the scene of the crime. In this respect the voice was merely
a physical characteristic of the accused, such as the size and shape of
his foot, hand, or body, his facial features, his fingerprints, or a scar
or mark on his body. The resemblance between the voice of the accused
3
Holt v. U. S., 218 U. S. 245 (1910).
118 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §375 (3d ed. 1940) ; in Holt v. U. S., 218 U. S. 245,
252 (1910) Mr. Justice Holmes said, "The prohibition of compelling a man in a
criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion
of his body as evidence when it may be material."
"' State v. Thompson, 161 N. C. 238, 76 S. E. 249 (1912).
"sState v. Graham, 74 N. C. 646, 647 (1876).
" Another borderline situation which is analogous to compulsory voice identification is one where the accused is compelled to furnish a sample of his handwriting for identification. In Hartzell v. U. S., 72 F. 2d 569 (C. C. A. 8th 1934)
the court admitted such evidence and said that it was similar to being present in
court and being identified. Contra: Bertran v. Samson, 53 P. I. 570 (1929).
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37

when compelled to speak and the voice heard at the time the rape was
-committed should not be excluded as a violation of the privilege against
self incrimination. It should be admitted as a fact calculated to aid the
jury in discovering the truth, the correctness of the identification going
38
to the weight and not the admissibility of the evidence.
LERoY

F. FULLER.

Labor Law-Unfair Labor Practices-Employer By-passing
Designated Bargaining Agent
An employer, after having bargained to an impasse with the certified
representative of the employees, submitted his final proposal directly to
strikers individually by mail, requesting them to vote on a ballot provided as to whether they would be willing to return to work upon the
terms proposed by the employer but rejected by the union. The National
Labor Relations Board found' that the employer interfered with the
rights of the employees to bargain collectively within the meaning of
Section 8(a) (1)2 of the National Labor Relations Act. Upon petition
to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for enforcement
of the order, it was held that the evidence did not justify a finding of
an unfair labor practice because: (1) the letter disclosed no effort to
bargain with the employees individually; (2) the employer had evidenced his good faith in dealing with the union; and (3) the employer
" No power of compulsion beyond that ordinarily permitted in obtaining testimony should be allowed. The powers of compelling testimony are discussed in 8
WiGmoRE, EVIDENCE §2195 (3d ed. 1940). If the accused refuses to repeat the
words, testimony as to this refusal would be competent. State v. Graham, 74
N. C. 646 (1876).
" The question of admissibility of voice identification on grounds other than
violation of the privilege against self-incrimination is beyond the scope of this
mnote. Proper safeguards should be taken to prevent inducement or suggestion
of the identification. The accused should be presented in company with others
who are similar in appearance. This procedure was followed in the instant case.
-3 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE §§786, 786a (1946). In general such identification is admissible, its probative value to be a question for the jury. Riner v. State, 128
Fla. 848, 176 So. 38 (1937); Fussell v. State, 93 Ga. 450, 21 S. E. 97 (1895);
-Commonwealth v. Wifiliams, 105 Mass. 67 (1870); 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §660
(3d ed. 1940) ; STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVImENcE, §96 (1946).
' Penokee Veneer Co., 74 N. L. R. B. 1683 (1947).
249 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. §158(1) (1946), as amended by National
Labor Management Relations Act, 61 STAT. , 29 U. S. C. §158(a) (1) (Supp.
1947): "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-(l) to interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
Section 7." Sec. 7 provides, "Employees shall have the right to self organization,
- to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall
also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the
extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership
in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in Section
_ 8(a) (3)."
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had never been charged with failure to bargain collectively nor any
3
previous unfair conduct.
Section 14 of the Act provides that it is the policy of the United
States to remove recognized sources of industrial strife by establishing
equality of bargaining power and encouraging collective bargaining between employers and employees. Fundamental to the whole structure
of collective bargaining are the exclusive bargaining rights5 granted to
the proper representative of the employees. The duty of the employer
to bargain collectively with the union designated by the employees includes the negative duty to refrain from bargaining with any other group
or individual.8
Fact situations of a wide variety have arisen before the National
Labor Relations Board which present the question of whether or not
it is an unfair labor practice for the employer to disregard or by-pass
the union designated by the employees as their bargaining representative. The Board has consistently held that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to by-pass the designated representative of the
employees by dealing directly with them individually 7 or by unilaterally
determining conditions of employment. 8 Similarly, unfair labor prac'National Labor Relations Board v. Penokee Veneer Co., 168 F. 2d 868
(C. C. A. 7th 1948).

'49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. §151 (1946), as amended, 61 STAT. -,
29 U. S. C. §151 (Supp. 1947).
'National Labor Relations Act, 49 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. §158(5)
(1946), as amended, 61 STAT. - , 29 U. S. C. §158(a) (5) (Supp. 1947) : "It

shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of
Section 9(a)." Sec. 9(a) provides, "Representatives designated or selected for
the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit
appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the
employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates
of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment. . . ." See
generally: Weyand, Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 45 COL. L. REv. 556
(1945).
8
Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 321 U. S. 678,
683-684 (1943) ; National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Corp., 301
U. S. 1, 44 (1936); 2 TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 328

(1940).
See, e.g., Craddock-Terry Shoe Corp., 73 N. L. R. B. 1339 (1947); Twin
City Milk Producers Ass'n, 61 N. L. R. B. 69 (1945) ; Arundel Corp., 59 N. L.
R. B. 505 (1944) ; Burke Machine Tool Co., 36 N. L. R. B. 1329 (1941), enforcement granted (mior modifications), 133 F. 2d 618 (C. C. A. 6th 1942) ; Highland
Shoe, Inc., 23 N. L. R. B. 259 (1940), enforcement granted, 119 F. 2d 218 (C. C.
A. Ist 1941) ; Pacific Gas Radiator Co., 21 N. L. R. B. 630 (1940) ; Stout, Charles
Banks, 15 N. L. R. B. 541 (1939); Reed & Prince Mfg. Co.," 12 N. L. R. B. 944
(1939), enforcement granted (minor modifications), 118 F. 2d 874 (C. C. A. 1st
1941); Williams Coal Co., 11 N. L. R. B. 579 (1939); Hopwood Retinning Co.,
4 N. L. R. B. 922 (1938), enforcement granted (as modified), 98 F. 2d 97 (C. C.
A. 2d 1938); Biles-Coleman Lumber Co., 4 N. L. R. B. 679 (1937), enforcement
granted, 98 F. 2d 18 (C. C. A. 9th 1938) ; 4 NLRB ANN. REP. 137 (1939).
8 See, e.g., Hartz Stores, 71 N. L. R. B. 848 (1946): May Dep't. Stores Co..
53 N. L. R. B. 1366 (1943), enforcement granted, 146 F. 2d 66 (C. C. A. 8th
1944), aff'd, 326 U. S. 376 (1945); Hirsch Mercantile Co., 45 N. L. R. B. 377
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tices have been found when an employer urges striking employees to
return to work under the employer's terms regardless of the decision
of their chosen bargaining representative, or when an employer conducts a poll among the employees to determine their wishes about
returning to work. 10
A review of the cases in the circuit courts of appeals reveals a
divergence of opinion. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals set
aside the Board's finding of an unfair labor practice where the employer conducted his own strike vote subsequent to a strike resolution
of the union,"- but approved a finding of an unfair labor practice when
an employer went over the head of the union and submitted an employment contract to a mass meeting of employees. 12 In National Labor
Relations Board v. Remington Rand 13 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld a finding of an unfair labor practice where an employer
conducted a strike vote of his own, disregarding the strike vote conducted by the union. The Board's finding of an unfair labor practice
was rejected by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals where the employer
had polled the employees, rather than bargain with their representative,
with reference to holiday and overtime work.' 4 The Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals conceded that it was unfair for an employer to effect a wage
cut unilaterally' 5 but reached an opposite result when the employer
0
unilaterally increased- wages.'
(1942); Wilcox Oil & Gas Co., 28 N. L. R. B. 79 (1940); Southern Cotton Oil
Co., 26 N .L. R. B. 177 (1940) ; Brown Shoe Co., 1 N. L. R. B. 803 (1936). But
cf. May Dep't. Stores Co., 53 N. L. R. B. 976 (1943).
'See, e.g., National Container Corp., 57 N. L. R. B. 565 (1944); Chicago

Molded Products Corp., 38 N. L. R. B. 1111 (1942); Montgomery Ward & Co.,

37 N. L. R. B. 100 (1941), enforcement granted, 133 F. 2d 676 (C. C. A. 9th
1942); Martin Bros. Box Co., 35 N. L. R. B. 217 (1941), enforcement granted,

130 F. 2d 202 (C. C. A. 7th 1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 660 (1942); Atlas

Mills, 3 N. L. R. B. 10 (1937). But cf. Gulf States Utilities Co., 42 N. L. R. B.
988 (1942).
1"Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 46 N. L. R. B. 714
(1943), enforcement granted
(as mnodified), 147 F. 2d 262 (C. C. A. 6th 1945); Biles-Coleman Lumber Co., 4

N. L. R. B. 679 (1937), enforcement granted, 98 F. 2d 18 (C. C. A. 9th 1938) ;
accord, Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co., 26 N. L. R. B. 975 (1940), enforcentent
denied, 121 F. 2d 602 (C. C. A. 7th 1941). But cf. Fafnir Bearing Co., 73 N. L.
R. B. 1008 (1947) (strike called in violation of contract).
" National Labor Relations Board v. Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co., 121 F.

2d 602 (C. C. A. 7th 1941) (strike resolution illegal).

12 National
Labor Relations Board v. Martin Bros. Box Co., 130 F. 2d 202
(C. C. A. 7th 1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S: 660 (1942) ; accord, National Labor
Relations Board v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F. 2d 676 (C. C. A. 9th 1943).
94 F. 2d 862 (C. C. A. 2d 1938), cert. denied, 304 U. S. 576, 585 (1938);
accord, National Labor Relations Board v. New Era Die Co., 118 F. 2d 500
(C. C. A. 3d 1941).
"4National Labor Relations Board v. Brown-Brockmeyer Co., 143 F. 2d 537
(C. C. A. 6th 1944).
" National Labor Relations Board v. Whittier Mills Co., 111 F. 2d 474 (C. C.
A. 5th 1940) ; accord, Great Southern Trucking Co. v. National Labor Relations
Board, 127 F. 2d 180 (C. C. A. 4th 1942); National Labor Relations Board v
Pilling & Son Co., 119 F. 2d 32 (C. C. A. 3d 1941).
" National Labor Relations Board v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 167 F
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The United States Supreme Court faced the question in two cases.
In Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board,17 at
the request of the employees, the employer negotiated with them and
granted a wage increase without the intervention of the union. In May
Department Stores Co. v. National Labor Relations Board's the employer unilaterally applied to the War Labor Board for approval of a
wage increase. In both cases the Court held that the National Labor
Relations Board was justified in finding unfair labor practices in spite
of the extenuative circumstances that the Medo case employees in effect
requested the employer to by-pass the union, and the May case employer's unilateral action consisted of a mere preliminarystep toward a wage
adjustment. Thus the Supreme Court has given strong support to the
proposition that it is unfair for the employer to by-pass the designated
employee representatives either by dealing with employees directly or
by unilateral action.
The findings of unfair labor practices in these cases are not always
based on the same provision of the Act. The conduct of the employer
in by-passing the union has been treated as evidence of bad faith in
bargaining and therefore a failure to bargain as required in Section
8(a) (5), 19 and an interference with the rights of the employees which
are protected by the general terms of Section 8(a) (1).20
Though a viblation of 8(a) (5) is technically a violation of 8(a) (1)
also, 2 1 it is not necessary to find a violation of 8(a) (5) in order to find
2d 662 (C. C. A. 5th 1948), cert. granted, 69 Sup. Ct. 52 (1948). Contra:
National Labor Relations Board v. May Dep't. Stores Co., 146 F. 2d 66 (C. C. A.
8th 1944), aff'd, 326 U. S. 376 (1945).
:7 321 U. S. 678, 684-685 (1943)
("That it is a violation of the essential principle of collective bargaining and an infringement of the Act for the employer
to disregard the bargaining representative by negotiating with individual employees . . . with respect to wages, hours and working conditions was recognized
The statute guarantees to all employees the right to bargain
by this court ....
collectively through their chosen representative. Bargaining carried on by the
employer directly with the employees . . . who have not revoked their designation
of a bargaining agent, would be subversive of the mode of collective bargaining
which the statute has ordained, as the Board, the expert body in this field, has
found. Such conduct is therefore an interference with the rights guaranteed by
§7 and a violation of §8(1) of the Act.").
18 326 U. S. 376, 384 (1945) (citing the Medo case, the Court said, "Employer
action to bring about changes in wage scales without consultation and negotiation
with the certified representative of its employees cannot, we think, logically or
realistically, be distinguished from bargaining with individuals or minorities.").
"oSee note 5 supra; Great Southern Trucking Co. v. National Labor Relations
Board, 127 F. 2d 180 (C. C. A. 4th 1942); National Labor Relations Board v.
Pilling & Son Co., 119 F. 2d 32 (C. C. A. 3d 1941); Weyand, supra note 5, at
579-580.
" May Dep't. Stores Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 326 U. S. 376
385 (1945); Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 321
U. S. 678, 684 (1943) ("Such conduct is therefore an interference with the rights
guaranteed by §7 and a violation of §8(1) of the Act.") ; National Labor Relations
Board v. Whittier Mills Co., 111 F. 2d 474 (C. C. A. 5th 1940) (conduct may
constitute failure to bargain, interference, or both).
2Arts Metal Construction Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 110 F. 2d
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a violation of 8(a) (1).22 Thus it appears that by-passing the designated
representative of the employees, if not a refusal to bargain, may constitute interference, though the possibility seems to be overlooked on
23
occasion.
The instant case is open to criticism on two principle grounds :24
1. The reasons given by the court to support its conclusion that
the employer committed no unfair labor practice in conducting the poll
among the employees may constitute a valid argument that the employer
had not refused to bargain with the designated union within the meaning of §8(a) (5). However, the reasoning does not support a conclusion
that the employer had not interfered with rights of the employees protected by §8(a) (1),2 5 the only unfair labor practice charged against
the employer in this case.
2. On the merits, it is difficult to conceive of any employer conduct
which could more effectively interfere with the rights of the employees
to bargain collectively through the representative of their own choosing.
Though the mere act of conducting a poll among strikers to determine
their wishes about returning to work may appear to be innocent on the
surface, a consideration of the effect of such conduct brings out a different picture. By contacting each employee individually, the employer
subjects them to the same pressures which the Act was intended to
eliminate and "minimizes the influence of organized bargaining.120 An
148 (C. C. A. 2d 1940) ; Note, 9 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 360, 362 ("The committee

reports indicate that the unfair labor practices set forth in subsections (2), (3),
(4), and (5) of section 8, are not intended to limit the guaranties of subsection
(1) of that section, but are merely intended to set out with greater particularity
some of the unfair labor practices requiring such amplification. SEN. RE'. No.
573, 74th Cong. 1st Sess., at 9; H. R. Rat'. No. 1147, 74th Cong. 1st Sess., at
17."). But cf. National Labor Relations Board v. Express Publishing Co., 312
U. S. 426 (1941).
22 Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 321 U. S.
678, 684 (1943) (quoted supra note 20. By implication).
23 It is believed that National Labor Relations Board v. Algoma Plywood &
Veneer Co., 121 F. 2d 602 (C. C. A. 7th 1941) is in this category. See note 24

infra.

2" The instant case is also to be criticized for drawing its own inferences from
the evidence, in disregard of the well established rule that inferences are to be
drawn by the Board and not the courts. National Labor Relations Board v.
Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U. S. 261 (1938). In 2 TELLER, LABOR
DISPUTES AND COLLECrIVE BARGAINING §396 n. 50 (Supp. 1947) it is suggested
that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in particular continues to place itself
in the position of the Board by "looking to the general picture disclosed by the
facts upon which the Board predicated its decision and order, and passing on the
petition ... in the light of this general picture."
2 The same error in reasoning was committed by the same court in National
Labor Relations Board v. Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co., 121 F. 2d 602, 608
(C. C. A. 7th 1941), relied upon in the principal case. There the employer's conduct in holding his own strike vote was said to be a "proper and necessary business expedient." Assuming that this justifies a refusal or failure to bargain, does
it necessarily follow that there has been no interference with the employees' right
to bargain collectively through their representative?
2" May Dep't. Stores Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 326 U. S. 376,
385 (1945).
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immediate consequence would be to discredit the union in the eyes of
the employees by demonstrating that the union does not effectively represent them.27 The ultimate consequence may be the complete destruction
of the actual bargaining capacity of the representative.28
LIvINGSTON VERNON.

Libel-Theories of Liablity-Publication as Single
or Multiple Tort
At common law it was uniformly held that each time a libelous
article was brought to the attention of a third person a new publication
had occurred and each publication gave rise to a separate cause of
action.' This is still the law in many jurisdictions2 and is the view
adopted by the Restatement of Torts,8 but the weight of modern author-

ity favors the "single publication" rule of liability. 4 This rule contemplates that, whereas each publication does give rise to a separate cause
of action, in the case of newspapers, magazines and books there is but
one publication which occurs at the place where the alleged libel is published 5 and is completed when the libelous matter has been composed,
6
printed and generally distributed.
" National Labor Relations Board v. Remington Rand, 94 F. 2d 862, 870
(C. C.A. 2d 1938).
28 Ibid.
IODGERs, LIBEL AND SLANDER 139 (6th ed. 1929); see Age-Herald Pub. Co. v.

Huddleston,
207 Ala. 40, 43, 92 So. 193, 196 (1921).
2
E.g., Hartmann v. American News Co., 69 F. Supp. 736 (W. D. Wis. 1947);
Holden v. American News Co., 52 F. Supp. 24 (E. D. Wash. 1943), app. dismissed, 144 F. 2d 249 (C. C. A. 9th 1944) ; Lockey v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
26 Tenn. App. 564, 174 S. W. 2d 575 (1943); Underwood v. Smith, 93 Tenn.
687, 27 S. W. 1008 (1894) ; Renfro Drug Co. v. Lawson, 138 Tex. 434, 160 S. W.
2d 246 (1942) ; Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, 14 Q. B. 185, 117 Eng. Rep. 75
(1849).
3
RESTATEMENT, TORTS §578(b) (1938).
'Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 166 F. 2d 127 (C. C. A. 3d 1948); Polchlopek v.
American News Co., 73 F. Supp. 309 (D. Mass. 1947); McGlue v. Weekly Publications, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 744 (D. Mass. 1946); Cannon v. Time, Inc., 39 F.
Supp. 660 (S. D. N. Y. 1939) ; Backus v. Look, 39 F. Supp. 662 (S. D. N. Y.
1939) ; Means v. MacFadden Publications, 25 F. Supp. 993 (S. D. N. Y. 1939) ;
Age-Herald Pub. Co. v. Huddleston, 207 Ala. 40, 92 So. 193 (1921); Winrod v.
Time, Inc., 334 Ill. App. 59, 78 N. E. 2d 708 (1948); Forman v. Mississippi Publisher's Corp., 195 Miss. 90, 14 So. 2d 344 (1943) ; Gregoire v. G. P. Putnam's
Sons, 298 N. Y. 119, 81 N. E. 2d 45 (1948), reversing, 272 App. Div. 591, 74
N. Y. S. 2d 238 (1st Dep't 1947); Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspapers, Inc., 254 App.
Div. 211, 4 N. Y. S. 2d 640 (4th Dep't 1938), aff'd, 279 N. Y. 716, 18 N. E. 2d
676 (1939), rearg. denied, 280 N. Y. 572, 20 N. E. 2d 21 (1939); see Julian v.
Kansas City Star Co., 209 Mo. 35, 71, 107 S. W. 496, 500 (1907); cf. Murray v.
Galbraith, 86 Ark. 50, 109 S. W. 1011 (1908).
Contra: Julian v. Kansas City Star Co., 209 Mo. 35, 107 S. W. 496 (1907).
Compare Age-Herald Pub. Co. v. Huddleston, 207 Ala. 40, 92 So. 193 (1921)
with Julian v. Kansas City Star Co., supra.
' General distribution to newsstands and subscribers is all that is required. The
mailing out of miscellaneous copies to replace those lost or damaged, or in response
to requests for the purchase of single copies is a part of the original publication
and does not constitute a republication such as will amount to an additional tort
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This conflict of theories has been thrown into sharp relief by a
recent Pennsylvania federal court decision. 7 Defendant, Time, Inc., in
an issue of Life magazine dated January 17, 1944, published an alleged
libel concerning plaintiff, Hartmann. Plaintiff instituted his suit for
damages on January 17, 1945, exactly one year after the date of the
magazine. Defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted by
the trial court s on the theory that while the issue bore the date January
17, 1944, general distribution to newsstands and subscribers had been
completed January 14, 1944, and, therefore, under the law, plaintiff's
cause of action, which had accrued on that date, was now barred by
the Pennsylvania one year statute of limitations. Plaintiff appealed.
For reasons beyond the scope of this note, the circuit court of appeals
held that plaintiff's complaint was broad enough to cover all causes of
action arising in his favor in the various states and foreign countries
and that under the doctrine of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins the law of the
jurisdiction in which each cause arose would govern in the creation of
substantive rights. For that reason, the summary judgment was correct as applied to those causes of action arising in "single publication"
jurisdictions, but erroneous as to those causes which accrued in "multiple tort" states, since in the latter group a new and different cause of
action is deemed to have arisen each time the libelous publication is
brought to the attention of a third party.
Obviously, this decision makes it necessary for the district court to
investigate the law of libel in the various jurisdictions so that it may
determine what portion of plaintiff's over-all claim persists and what
portion has been barred by the statute of limitations. Thus, we too
are put on inquiry as to North Carolina's position in regard to this
conflict in theories of liability.
The North Carolina stand is not clear. Indeed, the reports would
indicate that the supreme court has not spoken at all, but in one case10
it is apparent from the defendant's pleading and brief 1 that the single
E.g., Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 166 F. 2d 127 (C. C. A. 3d 1948);
Polchlopek v. American News Co., 73 F. Supp. 309 (D. Mass. 1947); Backus v.
Look, 39 F. Supp. 662 (S. D. N. Y. 1939); Age-Herald Pub. Co. v. Huddleston,
207 Ala. 40, 92 So. 193 (1921) ; Winrod v. Time, Inc., 334 Ill. App. 59, 78 N. E.
2d 708 (1948) ; Gregoire v. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 298 N. Y. 119, 81 N. E. 2d 45
(1948). Wide circulation serves only to increase the damages. E.g., Hartmann
v. Time, Inc., sipra; Winrod v. Time, Inc., supra; Gregoire v. G. P. Putnam's
Sons, supra. Contra: Winrod v. MacFadden Publications, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 249
(N. D. Ill.
1945) (supports single publication rule insofar as it applies to the
completed process of composing, printing and distributing, but will not permit
mailing out of additional copies later).
Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 166 F. 2d 127 (C. C. A. 3d 1948).
8
Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 671 (E. D. Pa. 1946).
or torts.

p304 U. S. 64 (1938).
Harrell v. Goerch, 209 N. C. 741, 184 S. E. 489 (1936).
"Brief for Appellee, p. 4, Harrell v. Goerch, 209 N. C. 741, 184 S. E. 489
(1936).
10
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publication rule has been pressed upon our court and rejected insofar
as that theory contemplates that the publication is completed when the
libelous matter has been generally distributed. Since, however, there
was no discussion of, or reference to, defendant's contention in the
report of the case, and since, at worst, only a portion of the rule was
rejected, this case need be given little, if any, weight in future adjudications and the court remains free to adopt the theory it finds most appealing to logic and justice.
It is submitted that the better reasoning favors the single publication, single tort rule and that the North Carolina court, when once
again given the opportunity to do so, should follow the line of decisions
which support it.
The old common law principles on which the multiple tort theory
is founded had their origin in relation to the single acts of individuals
in a more primitive society and should not be applied to the widely
circulated publications of today.12 To allow a plaintiff to pursue a
defendant publisher or distributor into every jurisdiction in which the
alleged libel is circulated, to give him as many causes of action within
each jurisdiction as there are copies circulated, and to set the statute
of limitations running anew with each purchase or perusal of the libelous
3
matter by a third person is "to shock the sense of justice and right.'
Such a rule of liability renders the statute of limitations completely ineffective,14 restricts the freedom of the press,' 5 operates as a burden
16
upon the courts and is impractical in application.
On the other hand, reasons why the multiple tort rule should persist
and the single tort doctrine be abandoned are rarely advanced and are
difficult of ascertainment. 1 7 The only discoverable specific objection to
12
Age-Herald Pub. Co. v. Huddleston, 207 Ala. 40, 92 So. 193 (1921).
3See Julian v. Kansas City Star Co., 209 Mo. 35, 101, 107 S.W. 496, 510
(1907) (dissenting opinion); accord, Winrod v. Time, Inc., 334 Ill. App. 59, 78
N. E. 2d 708 (1948) ; Gregoire v. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 298 N. Y. 119, 81 N. E.
2d 45 (1948).
"'E.g., Means v. MacFadden Publications, 25 F. Supp. 993 (S.D. N. Y.
1939) ; Gregoire v. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 298 N. Y' 119, 81 N. E. 2d 45 (1948).
Under the multiple tort doctrine the statute can never run so as to absolutely bar
an action as long as there is in existence a single copy of the publication capable
of being passed around or sold. Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, 14 Q. B. 185,
117 Eng. Rep. 75 (1849) (a newspaper was published more than 17 years before
suit was brought. Defendant pleaded the statute of limitations, but it was held
that the plea was negatived by proof that a single copy had been purchased within
the "Hartmann
statutory period).
v. Time, Inc., 166 F. 2d 127, 134 (C. C. A. 3d 1948).
10 Even if the circulation were restricted to one county, the rule, carried to
its logical conclusion, would permit the plaintiff to enlarge his declaration to
include as many counts as there are subscribers. Forman v. Mississippi Publisher's Corp., 195 Miss. 90, 107, 14 So. 2d 344, 347 (1943).
17 In multiple publication decisions, the old rule is usually accepted (and the
single publication rule rejected) with no reasons assigned. Holden v. American
News Co., 52 F. Supp. 24, 32 (E. D. Wash. 1943) ; Lockey v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 26 Tenn. App. 564, 174 S.W. 2d 575, 581 (1943) ; Renfro Drug Co. v.
Lawson, 138 Tex. 434, 443, 160 S.W. 2d 246, 251 (1942).
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the modern rule is that under it a venomous publisher "could with immunity print a large number of extra copies of an issue containing
libelous matter, retain them on hand and from time to time through
the years mail them to members of the general public."'1 This, it is
urged, would be a part of the original publication and, as such, would
not amount to another tort.
This argument, though weighty, would seem to be more concerned
with the applicability than the validity of the single publication doctrine.
It is to be remembered that this new theory of liability finds its basic
justification in the fact that it protects the publisher or distributor of
integrity from the legal hazards arising out of mass distribution of his
printed matter.19 This justification is lost in the case of a malicious
defendant who persists in circulating the libelous matter for the sake
of the libel itself and not as a usual business practice,2 0 and the beneficial single tort rule would appear inapplicable. In such a case, the
single publication court could hold with consistence that the further
malicious act of distribution, not occurring in the ordinary course of
business, amounts to a new publication and a new tort.
RoBRT PERRY, JR.
Negligence-Per Se or Evidence of-Violation of Statute as
In a recent case' plaintiff's decedent was killed by defendant's truck.
In an action brought to recover for the death, defendant claimed that
plaintiff's decedent was contributorily negligent in that at the time of
his death he was violating a statute requiring pedestrians to walk on
the left-hand side of any highway.2 Held: Plaintiff's decedent's violation of the statute did not make him contributorily negligent per se and
the question of his contributory negligence was for the jury.
Negligence is the failure to comply with the legal standard of care
"Winrod v. MacFadden Publications, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 249, 251 (N. D. Ill.

1945).

" Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 671, 679 (E. D. Pa. 1946) ("There is
discernible . . . a reluctance among the modem courts to apply that law (of
multiple tort liability) when confronted with a controvery involving large dis-

tributions of printed matter such as are made by present day newspaper and magazine publishers."); Winrod v. Time, Inc., 334 Ill. App. 59, 78 N. E.' 2d 708

(1948).
20 See Winrod v. Time, Inc., 334 Ill. App. 59, 65, 78 N. E. 2d 708, 710 (1948)
("... no new cause of action will accrue if the subsequent distribution is reasonably connected, by trade practice relating to the type of printed matter involved,
to the original distribution. .. ").
'Lewis v. Watson, 229 N. C. 20, 47 S. E. 2d 484 (1948).
2N.
C. GENt. STAT. §20-174 (1943): "It shall be unlawful for pedestrians to
walk along the traveled portion of any highway except on the extreme left-hand

side thereof, and such pedestrians shall yield the right-of-way to approaching

traffic."
R .ESTATEMENT, TORTS §284 (1934) ; HARPER ON TORTS §§68, 69 (1933) ; CLERK
& LINDSELL ON TORTS §§12, 13 (7th ed., Wyatt-Paine, 1921) ; Moore v. Chicago

19491

NOTES AND COMMENTS

which standard may be either established by common law principles or
by statute. 4 Logically then, the violation of a statute designed to protect persons or property should constitute negligence without more.
Many courts have so held 5 and it has been the rule in North Carolina
for some time that such is negligence per se.6 However, some decisions
Iron Works, 183 N. C. 438, 111 S. E. 776 (1922) ; Patton v. Atlantic C. L. R. R.,
197 N. C. 17, 147 S. E. 698 (1929) ; Helms v. Citizens Light & Power Co., 192
N. C. 784, 136 S.E. 9 (1926) ; Saunders v. Southern Ry., 167 N. C. 375, 83 S. E._
573 (1914).
"RESTATEMENT, TORTS §285, comments b and c (1934); CLARK, THE LAW OF
TORTS §100 (1926) ; PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 264 (1941) ; see

also, for a good statement, Osborne v. McMasters, 40 Minn. 103, 105, 41 N. W.
543 (1889). It is to be noted that, as used in this Note, negligence includes contributory negligence and statute includes ordinance.
'Ward v. Cathey, 210 S.W. 289 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) (ordinance forbidding
autos to pass standing street-car); Opitz v. Schenck, 178 Cal. 636, 174 Pac. 40
(1918) (speed limit set by ordinance) ; Wright v. Salzberger & Son, 63 Cal. App.
450, 218 Pac. 785 (1923) (ordinance forbidding coasting); Riser v. Smith, 136
Minn. 417, 162 N. W. 520 (1917) (speeding ordinance); Amberg v. Kinley, 214
N. Y. 531, 108 N. E. 830 (1915) (statute requiring fire escape) ; Annis v. Britton,
232 Mich. 291, 205 N. W. 128 (1925) (housing statutes) ; Fox v. Bearekman, 178
Ind. 572, 99 N. E. 989 (1912) (speed statute).
'Leathers v. Durham Tobacco Co., 144 N. C. 330, 57 S. E. 11 (1907) (statute
prohibiting employment of children under 12 years of age in factories) ; Starnes
v. Albion Mfg. Co., 147 N. C. 556, 61 S.E. 525 (1908) (statute forbidding employment of children under 12 years of age in factories) ; Rich v. Asheville Elec.
Co., 152 N. C. 689, 68 S.E. 232 (1910) (statute requiring street passenger railway
companies to use vestibule fronts on passenger cars) ; Paul v. Atlantic C. L. R. R.,
170 N. C. 230, 87 S. E. 66 (1915) (ordinance forbidding blocking of street by
railroads for more than five minutes) ; Zageir v. Southern Express Co., 171 N. C.
692, 89 S.E. 43 (1916) (ordinance requiring license for car) ; Taylor v. Stewart,
172 N. C. 203, 90 S.E. 134 (1916) (statute prohibiting persons under 16 years of
age from driving autos upon highway); Godfrey v. Queen City Coach Co., 201
N. C. 264, 159 S. E. 412 (1931) (speed statute) ; King v. Pope, 202 N. C. 554,
163 S.E. 447 (1932) (statutes prohibiting reckless driving, setting speed restrictions, requiring that driving be upon right-hand side of highway) ; Ham v. Greensboro Ice & Fuel Co., 204 N. C. 614, 169 S.E. 180 (1933) (ordinances requiring
license to operate truck, parking parallel to curb and prohibiting backing in city
street); Johnson v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 205 N. C. 127, 170 S. E. 120 (1933)
(ordinance regulating speed of trains in city limits); Sherwood v. Southeastern
Express Co., 206 N. C. 243, 173 S.E. 605 (1934) (ordinance prohibiting backing
of motor vehicle in street); Holland v. Strader, 216 N. C. 436, 5 S. E. 2d 311
(1939) (statute requiring person, before stopping motor vehicle on highway, to
determine whether he can safely do so) ; Williams v. Woodward, 218 N. C. 305,
10 S.E. 2d 913 (1940) (statute providing that vehicles be operated on right-hand
side of highway and that warning be given pedestrians) ; Miller v. Lewis & Holmes
Motor Freight Corp., 218 N. C. 464, 11 S. E. 2d 300 (1940) (statute requiring
that pedestrians walk on left-hand side of highway) ; Tarrant v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., 221 N. C. 390, 20 S.E. 2d 565 (1942) (statute prohibiting driving upon
highway at greater speed than is reasonable or prudent). In Leathers v. Durham
Tobacco Co., supra, the court quoted with approval the following from I THompSON ON NEGLIGENcE §10: "When the legislature [or city council], having in view
the promotion of the safety of the public or of individual members of the public,
commands or forbids the doing of a particular act, . . . a failure to do the act
commanded, or doing the act prohibited is negligence as a mere matter of law,
otherwise negligence per se; and this, irrespective of all questions of the exercise
of prudence, diligence, care, or skill. So that if it is the proximate cause of hurt
or damage to another, and if that other is without contributory fault, the case is
decided in his favor. . . " The court further quoted with approval from I
STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LiABxrir §172 (1906): "The violation of an
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have seemed to deviate from this position by saying that such violation
is only evidence of negligence.7 For example, in Henderson v. Durhamn
Traction Co.8 where violation of a statute requiring street railways to
use fenders in front of their cars was held to be evidence of negligence,
it was said: "The element of proximate cause must be established and
it will not necessarily be presumed from the fact that a statute or city
ordinance has been violated. Negligence . . . can not result in a right
of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of
by the plaintiff." 9 On the other hand, in Ham v. Greensboro Ice and
Fuel Co.10 where the violation of a city ordinance requiring parking
of trucks at the curb was held to be negligence per se, the court said:
"All the decisions of this state since (1913) concur in the view that
the violation of an ordinance or statute . . . is negligence per se. Notwithstanding, the same decisions do not permit recovery.., unless there
was a causal relation between the violation and the injury.""
imposed statutory duty is a sort of negligence per se . .. and the sole question
to be settled in cases of this kind is whether that delinquency can be considered
a proximate cause of the damage of which complaint is made."
Edwards v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 129 N. C. 78, 39 S.E. 730 (1901) (ordinance regulating speed of trains within city) ; Henderson v. Durham Traction Co.,
132 N. C. 779, 44 S. E. 598 (1903) (statute requiring street passenger railway
companies to have fenders on front of all cars run); Duval v. East Carolina
R. R., 134 N. C. 331, 46 S. E. 750 (1904) (contract by defendant with city to
limit speed of its trains, which contract was similar to ordinance) ; Templeton v.
Kelley, 215 N. C. 577, 2 S. E. 2d 696 (1939) (statute prohibiting pedestrians'
crossing at other places than marked cross-walk between adjacent intersections
which have traffic control signals in operation) ; Gaskins v. Kelly, 228 N. C. 697,
47 S. E. 2d 34 (1948) (statute requiring pedestrians to yield right-of-way to all
vehicles when crossing road at point other than marked cross-walks or within
unmarked cross-walks at intersections) ; Ward v. Bowles, 228 N. C. 273, 45 S. E.
2d 354 (1947) (statute prohibiting "cutting corners" when turning auto at intersection).
a 132 N. C. 779, 44 S. E. 598 (1903).
' Id. at 784 (italics supplied). To the same effect, see Duval v. Atlantic C. L.
R. R., 129 N. C. 78, 39 S.E. 730 (1901), where it was held that violation of a
contract by the defendant which it had with the City of New Bern to limit the
speed of its trains through the streets of said city was evidence of negligence, the
court said: "It (i.e., the contract) was similar to an ordinance, in purpose and
legal effect at least, in civil actions. We do not feel compelled in this case to go
to the extent of saying that the violation . . . gives rise to a cause of acton; but
we hold that, equally with the violation of an ordinance, it is evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant" (italics supplied).
20 204 N. C. 614, 169 S.E. 180 (1933).
" Id.at 617 (italics supplied). See also, Paul v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 170 N. C.
230, 87 S.E. 66 (1915) ; Rich v. Asheville Elec. Co., 152 N. C. 689, 68 S. E. 232
(1910) ; Godfrey v. Queen City Coach Co., 201 N. C. 264, 159 S. E. 412 (1931) ;
Norfleet v. Hall, 204 N. C. 573, 169 S.E. 143 (1933) ; James v. Carolina Coach
Co., 207 N. C. 742, 178 S.E. 607 (1935) ; Leathers v. Durham Tobacco Co., 144
N. C. 330, 57 S.E. 11 (1907); Starnes v. Albion Mfg. Co., 147 N. C. 556, 61
S. E. 525 (1908) ; Zageir v. Southern Express Co., 171 N. C. 692, 89 S. E. 43
(1916); King v. Pope, 202 N. C. 554, 163 S.E. 447 (1932) ; Taylor v. Stewart,
172 N. C. 203, 90 S.E. 134 (1916) ; Johnson v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 205 N. C.
127, 170 S.E. 120 (1933) ; Sherwood v. Southeastern Express Co., 206 N. C. 243,
173 S.E. 605 (1934) ; Holland v. Strader, 216 N. C. 436, 5 S. E. 2d 311 (1939) ;
Williams v. Woodward, 218 N. C. 305, 10 S.E. 2d 913 (1940); Tarrant v. Pepsi
Cola Bottling Co., 221 N. C. 390, 20 S.E. 2d 565 (1942).
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An examination of the language of these two cases demonstrates
that when the court says that violation of a statute is evidence of negligence, it is using a broader concept of negligence than when it says
that such is negligence per se. In the former instance its concept includes both breach of a legal standard of care and the element of
proximate cause. In the latter it contains only the breach of a legal
standard of care. In the differing content of these concepts lies the
explanation of the court's use of the different terminologies. If the
court is thinking of the broader concept of negligence it will say that
violation of a statute is evidence of negligence. Its reasoning in such a
case is that since its concept of negligence includes proximate cause and
since proximate cause is not attendant upon every breach of a statutory
standard of care, an element of its concept of negligence may be missing. Therefore, the court does not feel free to summarily say that the
whole concept is present and that the violation is negligence per se.
However, if the court is thinking of the narrower concept of negligence
it will say that the violation of a statute is negligence per se because
the narrower concept includes only breach of a legal standard of care
and the violation of a statute readily furnishes that element.
This difference in what the court says carries over into what it does.
In all these cases' 5 both breach of a statute and a proximately caused
injury were prerequisites to recovery. However, the presence of these
elements is ascertained differently depending upon whether the court
says that violation of a statute is evidence of negligence or negligence
per se. Since proximate cause includes questions of public policy, statutory interpretation, and actual causation, 13 it is apparent that no part of
the problem of proximate cause can properly be submitted to the jury
4
except that of actual causation. Nevertheless, in the principal case1
the following issue was submitted to the jury--"Did the lpaintiff's intestate, by his own negligence, contribute to his death, as alleged in the
answer?" This issue included questions of negligence and proximate
cause mingled together and was approved on appeal. The submission
of such double barreled issues allows matters to be determined by the
jury which are properly for the court, such as whether the injured person was a member of the class of persons which the statute was designed
to protect and whether the injury was one of the sort which the statute
was designed to prevent.
It is suggested that this abdication by the court of its proper functions could be eliminated in this way: When the court is faced with
violation of a statute designed to protect persons or property it should
11
See notes 6 and 7 supra.
23 GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927).
' See note 1 supra.
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say that the violator is negligent per se, for which holding it has ample
precedent.' 5 The question then left to be answered would be whether
the violation was the proximate cause of the injury. The court should,
in answering this question, determine at the outset, by interpretation of
the statute involved, whether the injured party belongs to the class of
persons which the statute was designed to protect and whether the injury which has occurred is one of the sort which the statute was designed
to prevent. If the court finds that the answer to either of these questions
is in the negative, it should rule, as a matter of law, that the violation
was not the proximate cause of the injury. If the court finds that the
injured person is a member of the class of persons which the statute
was designed to protect and that the injury which has occurred is of
the sort which the statute was designed to prevent, there remain two
questions; namely, whether the party violated the statute and whether
the act of the party which violated the statute actually caused the injury
of which complaint is made. If more than one inference can reasonably
be drawn as to the answer to either of these two questions, it should be
submitted to the jury for their finding as to which inference should be
drawn.
MAX OLIVER COGBURN.

Taxation of Income-Dividends in Kind-Corporation's Liability
In a recent case' before the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, the taxpayer corporation held certain notes which had been
charged off as wholly worthless and deducted as bad debts in previous
income tax returns. In 1942, when it became apparent that some of
the notes could be collected, the notes were declared as a dividend in
kind and distributed to the stockholders. No value was placed on the
notes by the corporation. The commissioner determined that the amount
collected by the stockholders on the dividend notes was taxable as income to the corporation. The Tax Court reversed the commissioner,
holding that a corporation does not realize income by its distribution of
a dividend in kind. 2 The circuit court of appeals reversed the Tax
Court. It held that the amount collected on the notes was income to
the extent of the tax benefit received on account of the deductions
previously allowed and was taxable to the corporation under the assignment of expectant income theory.
The taxpayer and the Tax Court relied on General Utilities &
Operating Co. v. Helvering for the proposition that a corporation does
"5See note 6 supra.
Commissioner v. First State Bank of Stratford, 168 F. 2d 1004 (C. C. A.
5th 1948).
'First State Bank of Stratford, 8 T. C. 831 (1947).
S296 U. S.200 (1935).
1
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not realize income by its distribution of a dividend in kind. In that
case the corporation had bought stock of another corporation which
increased in value, and the corporation had a chance to sell it at a great
profit. Rather than make the sale itself, it distributed the stock as a
dividend in kind to its stockholders who in turn made the sale. The
Supreme Court held that the corporation derived no taxable gain from
the transaction.
The cases involving the tax consequences to the corporation of its
distribution of a dividend in kind have tended to divide into two classes.
1. Where the dividend is declared in a specific amount of money and
paid in kind, then the difference between the cost of the property in
the corporation's hands and the amount of the dividend declared is tax4
able to the corporation, since it is using the property to pay off a debt.
2. Where the dividend is declared in kind and paid in kind the difference between the cost and the present market value is not a gain or loss
to the corporation. 5 The Supreme Court has never made this distinction
even though in the General Utilities case the director's resolution read
that "a dividend in the amount of $1,071,426.25 . .. is hereby declared
...payable in the Common Stock of The Islands Edison Company....
The commissioner contended that since the dividend was declared in a
specific amount of money a debt was created which was paid off by the
securities, but the Supreme Court did not discuss the point. The distinction does not seem to be justified because it makes the tax consequences depend upon the form of the director's resolution rather than
upon any actual gain to the corporation.
In this type of case the purpose of the corporation in declaring a
dividend in kind of property which has appreciated in value usually is
to avoid the double taxation attendant upon the normal procedure of
the corporation making a profit on the sale of the property and then
distributing the profit to its shareholders.( Some courts have said that
the purpose to avoid a tax does not establish tax liability, 7 but the circuit court of appeals in the General Utilities case8 upheld the tax on the
corporation on the theory that the whole scheme was contrived for the
sole purpose of avoiding the tax and for this reason the sale was, in
"Bacon-McMillan Veneer Co., 20 B. T. A. 556 (1930); Callanan Road Improvement Co., 12 B. T. A. 1109 (1928).
1 Commissioner v. Columbia Pacific Shipping Co., 77 F. 2d 759 (C. C. A. 9th
1935); First Say. Bank of Ogden v. Burnet, 53 F. 2d 919 (App. D. C. 1931).
0 In both the instant case and the General Utilities case the minutes of the
director's meeting clearly showed that the purpose of the dividend in kind was to
avoid tax consequences.
'E.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465 (1935) ; United States v. Isham,
17 Wall. 496 (U. S. 1837); Chisholm v. Commissioner, 79 F. 2d 14 (C. C. A. 2d
1935).
8 Helvering v. General Utilities & Operating Co., 74 F. 2d 972 (C. C. A. 4th

1935).
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effect, made by the corporation. The Supreme Court reversed on this
point because it had not been raised in the Tax Court and thus could not
be raised for the first time on appeal. So this approach might still be
open to create tax liability even under the General Utilities doctrine.
In the instant case tax liability was imposed in a more direct manner.
It has frequently been held that one who assigns future income is taxable for that income. 10 "The fruit is not to be attributed to a different
tree from that on which it grew."" The reasoning behind these cases
is that one who earns and has control over the disposition of income
enjoys it and realizes it in the statutory sense as much when he assigns
it to another as when he actually receives it. If the income is assigned
in payment of an existing obligation or in return for other economic
gain, it is obvious that the assignor realizes the income.' - But even if
the taxpayer makes a gift of the future income, it is still taxable to
3
him.1
The notes represented possible future income since they had been
charged off as worthless and deducted as bad debts on former income
tax returns.' 4 As stated by the court, "When the tax benefit for a bad
debt is obtained, the debt loses its nature as capital and becomes representative of that portion of the taxpayer's income which was not
taxed."'15 Thus any money collected on the notes by the corporation
would be income and when they were distributed as dividends in kind to
the stockholders the corporation was assigning future income, and the
amount collected on the notes was properly taxable to the corporation.' 0
0Cf. S. A. MacQueen Co. v. Commissioner, 67 F. 2d 857 (C. C. A. 3d 1934)
(corporation sold property to stockholder at a price less than its value. Stockholder then sold property and distributed the profit that he made on the sale to
the other stockholders according to their holdings. Held: profit made on the sale
by the stockholder is taxable to the corporation.).
"oE.g., Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S. 112 (1940) (interest coupons assigned);
Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U. S. 122 (1940) (commissions on renewal premiums
assigned) ; Lucas v. Earl, 281 U. S. 111 (1930) (future salary assigned).
" Helvering v. Horst, supra note 10.
2 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 276 U. S. 716 (1929) ; Lembcke v.
Commissioner, 126 F. 2d 940 (C. C. A. 2d 1942) ; see Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.
v. United
States, 296 U. S. 60, 64 (1935).
"3 E.g., Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S. 112 (1940); Commissioner v. Sunnen,
68 S. Ct. 715 (1948) ; Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U. S. 579 (1941) ; Helvering v.
Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (1940).
"E.g., St. Louis Refrigerating & Cold Storage Co. v. United States, 162 F.
2d 394 (C. C. A. 8th 1947); Helvering v. State Planters Bank and Trust Co.,
130 F. 2d 44 (C. C. A. 4th 1942) ; National Bank of Commerce v. Commissioner,
115 F. 2d 875 (C. C. A. 9th 1940). INT. REV. CoDE §22(b) (12) excludes from
gross income the amount collected on the bad debts to the extent that the previous
deductions did not result in a reduction of the taxpayer's tax.
1 Commissioner v. First State Bank of Stratford, 168 F. 2d 1004, 1008 (C. C.
A. 5th 1948).
" The dissent in the instant case insisted that if there were any tax liability it
should be measured by the market value of the notes rather than the amount
actually collected. For the purposes of this note it will be assumed that the
majority decided this point correctly.
This point would also raise the corollary question of how the dividend would
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Could the rule as to assignment of future income be properly
applied to situations of the General Utilities type, where stock of another corporation which has appreciated in value is distributed as a
dividend in kind? The rule has never been applied to gifts of property
which has appreciated in value.1 7 Thus the court in the instant case
drew a distinction between this and the General Utilities case. Here
the dividend consisted of charged-off notes, representing income, while
there the dividend was of appreciated stock, a capital asset.
However, it is doubtful if this distinction should exist in the case of
a corporation distributing a dividend in kind. In the case of a gift by
an individual, Congress has provided that the basis of the property for
the purpose of determining the taxable gain to the donee upon the sale
of the property by the donee shall be the same as if the property were
in the hands of the donor or the last owner who did not receive the
property by gift.' 8 Thus any appreciation in the value of the property
while in the hands of the donor is taxable to the donee when he makes a
sale. As long as this is the policy of Congress it would not seem to be
desirable to attempt to tax the appreciation to the donor also. No
analogous situation exists in the case of a corporation distributing a
dividend in kind. There the property received as a dividend is taxable
income to the stockholder at the market value of the property at the
time the stockholder received it.'0 In case of a future sale of the property by the stockholder the basis of the property is the value at which
it was taxable as income to him. 20 Therefore the appreciation which
took place while the property was in the hands of the corporation is not
taxed 2 ' and there would seem to be no good reason why that appreciation
should not be taxed to the corporation.
Moreover, it would seem that the corporation realizes the income as
much when the dividend is of appreciated stock of another corporation
be taxed to the shareholder. Would the amount realized on the notes be taxed
as income as collected or would the notes be taxed at their fair market value at
the time of distribution with any excess of amount collected over fair market
value treated as capital gain?
" People v. Wendell, 196 App. Div. 613, 188 N. Y. Supp. 510 (3d Dept. 1921)
is the only case found where it was attempted to tax the donor for the appreciation in value of property given away.
" INT. REv. CODE §113 (a) (2) ; Taft v. Bowers, 278 U. S. 470 (1929). This
section also provides that for the purpose of determining loss the basis shall be
the same as for determining gain or the fair market value of the property at the
time of the gift, whichever is lower.
"0INT. REv. CODE §115(j); Commissioner v. Wakefield, 139 F. 2d 280 (C. C.
A. 6th 1943) ; Golden State Theater & Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 125 F. 2d
641 20(C. C. A. 9th 1942)
John H. Cook, 38 B. T. A. 651; cf. Commissioner v. Timken, 141 F. 2d 625
(C. C. A. 6th 1944).
21 Of course the property is taxed at its appreciated value as income to the
stockholder, but as a somewhat similar proposition a gift of property is subjett
to a gift tax at its appreciated value.
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as when it is of charged-off notes. In both cases the corporation has
earned the income and has control over its disposition. Since the primary purpose of the corporation is to make profit for its stockholders
it can hardly be said that the corporation does not enjoy the benefit of
the difference between cost and present market value when it distributes
a dividend in kind of appreciated stock of another corporation to its
stockholders. It would seem that a corporation should not be allowed
to escape its normal tax burdens by declaring such dividends in kind,
and by applying the principle of the instant case to the General Utilities
case it would seem that a different result could be reached there.
WILLIAM

T. JOYNER,

JR.

